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I 
PARTIES TO THE APPEAL 
The parties to this Appeal are the Robert J. Pett and Charles Schultz, the 
Appellants and the only members and managers of Sure-Tech, L.L.C. (hereinafter, 
"Sure-Tech") and EML. Projects, Ltd., Ecology Management, Ltd., Waste Products. 
Inc., (hereinafter, "the Defendants") Sure-Tech, L.L.C., Steve Evans and Fred Evans 
who claim to be members and managers of Sure-Tech, L.L.C., Appellees. 
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IV 
JURISDICTION 
Original jurisdiction of this matter was vested in the Utah Supreme Court 
pursuant to Section 78-2-2 (3)(j), Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended. Jurisdiction is 
now vested in this Court pursuant to the provisions of § 78-2-2(4) Utah Code Ann. 1953, 
as amended. 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues on appeal are as follows: 
Issues of Fact: 
1. Did the trial court err in concluding that Steve Evans, or anyone other 
than Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz, had authority to enter into a stipulation dismissing this 
matter? (Record at page 1256). 
2. Did the trial court err in concluding that Mr. Schultz's offer to convey 
ownership of Sure-Tech was not withdrawn prior to the time Evans attempted to 
accept that offer? (Transcript at page 27, 59-60). 
3. Did the trial court err in concluding that Evans timely accepted Mr. 
Schultz's offer to convey ownership of Sure-Tech to Evans? (Transcript at page 27, 
59-60). 
4. Did the trial court err in concluding that Steve Evans testified truthfully at 
the May 30, 1995 hearing? (Transcript at page 27, 59-60, record at pages 1302,1493). 
Standard of Review for Issues of Fact: 
Issues of fact may be reversed on appeal only if they are found to be clearly 
erroneous. Cornish Town v. KoUer, 758 P.2d 919 (Utah 1988). 
Issues of Law: 
1. Did the trial court err as a matter of law in concluding that Evans was 
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legally entitled to act on behalf of Sure-Tech? (Record at page 1256). 
2. Did the trial court err as a matter of law in concluding that anyone other 
than Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz could legally act on behalf of Sure-tech? (Record at 
page 1298). 
3. Did the trial court err as a matter of law in concluding that Evans had 
any legal authority to stipulate to the dismissal of this matter? (Record at page 1297). 
4. Did the trial court err as a matter of law in refusing to allow Lisa Spivey 
to testify that a letter revoking Mr. Schultz's offer to convey ownership of Sure-Tech to 
the Evans or others had been mailed to Steve Evans, certified mail, prior to Evans' 
purported acceptance of Mr. Schultz's offer? (Transcript at page 55). 
5. Did the trial court err, as a matter of law, in dismissing this action? 
(Record at page 1297). 
6. Did the trial court err, as a matter of law, in denying Mr. Pett's and Mr. 
Schultz's Rule 60 Motion? (Record at page 1300-1357). 
Standard of Review for Issues of Law: 
Issues of law are subject to de novo review by an appellate court, and the court 
gives no deference to the trial court's conclusions of law. Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. 
State. 779 P.2d 634 (Utah 1989). 
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Rules: 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 59 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 301 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 1004 
VII 
ST A TEMENT OF THE CASE 
(A) 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a decision by Judge Brian of the Third Judicial District 
Court of Salt Lake County, permitting Steve Evans and other members of his family 
who claim to be members and managers to dismiss the complaint filed by Sure-Tech 
against the Defendants. The order permitting Evans to dismiss the case was entered 
over the objection of Robert Pett and Charles Schultz the only members and 
managers of Sure-Tech. The order was entered based on perjured testimony by 
Steve Evans claiming that Mr. Schultz offered to convey his and Mr. Pett's interest in 
Sure-Tech to the Evans and/or others, and Evans perjured testimony that he never 
received any letters from Mr. Schultz withdrawing the offer. 
(B) 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL COURT LEVEL 
Sure-Tech filed a complaint in this matter on April 4, 1994, seeking a 
dissolution of EML. Charles Schultz represented Sure-Tech in the law suit. Ccdlister 
Nebeker and McCullough (hereinafter, "Ccdlister") represented the Defendants in the 
law suit. Various motions were filed in the case and some discovery was attempted. 
On or about May 3, 1994, Ccdlister filed a Motion to Disqualify Mr. Schultz as 
counsel for Sure-Tech, claiming that Mr. Schultz had represented Sure-Tech in the 
past on the same issue. On May 20, 1994, Sure-Tech filed a Motion to Disqualify 
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Ccdlister, asserting that Callister, as corporate counsel for EML, could not represent 
EML against Sure-Tech, a limited partner, in the dissolution proceeding. Both motions 
were eventually heard in November 1994, and both Mr. Schultz and Callister were 
disqualified from the case. 
On or about April 21, 1995, Scott Daniels (hereinafter, "Daniels"), purporting to 
act on behalf of Sure-Tech, signed a Stipulation for Dismissal of the case. On or 
about April 24, 1995, Daniels filed an appearance in the case claiming to represent 
Sure-Tech. Richard Nebeker entered an appearance for EML on or about April 24, 
1995. On April 26, 1995, Mr. Schultz wrote to Judge Brian informing him that Daniels 
did not represent Sure-Tech and that Daniels had no authority to represent Sure-Tech 
in this case. Daniels then requested a hearing to determine who had authority to 
represent Sure-Tech. 
A "Motion Hearing" was scheduled for one half hour on May 30, 1995, at 9:00 
a.m. on Daniels' request. At that hearing, in contrast to the Notice from the trial court, 
evidence was taken and witnesses testified. 
At the hearing Steve Evans testified and falsely claimed he and his family 
members were owners of Sure-Tech. Steve Evans also falsely claimed that he had 
never received any letter from Mr. Schultz withdrawing the offer to convey ownership 
of Sure-Tech to Evans. 
Mr. Schultz testified at the May 30, 1995 hearing, stating that the only members 
of Sure-Tech were himself and Mr. Pett. Mr. Schultz also testified that he had sent 
Evans a letter revoking any offer to convey ownership of Sure-Tech to Evans, but 
informed the tried court that he did not have a copy of the letter at the hearing because 
he thought, based on the court's notice, that the hearing was a motion hearing not an 
evidentiary hearing. Mr. Schultz further testified that neither Evans nor any of his 
family had ever owned any interest in Sure-Tech and therefore, had no authority to act 
on behalf of Sure-Tech. 
At the May 30, 1995 hearing, the tried court received into evidence the Articles of 
Organization of Sure-Tech, the Annual Reports for Sure-Tech and the Operating 
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Agreement of Sure-Tech, showing that Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz were the only 
members and managers of Sure-Tech. 
The issue of whether or not a letter revoking Mr. Schultz's offer to convey 
ownership of Sure-Tech to Evans had been sent became of concern to the tried court, 
and Mr. Guyon asked the court for a few minutes to send someone to get a copy of the 
letter, but the court refused Mr. Guyon's request. Nonetheless, someone was sent to 
get a copy of the letter revoking the offer to convey ownership of Sure-Tech to Evans, 
but he did not arrive with the letter until five minutes after the hearing had concluded. 
Mr. Guyon, who represented Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz at the hearing, attempted 
to call Lisa Spivey to testify that a certified letter was sent to Steve Evans revoking the 
offer to convey Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz's ownership of Sure-Tech to the Evanses, but 
Judge Brian refused to let her testify. Mr. Guyon then proffered her testimony to the 
court, stating that she had personally mailed a letter revoking the offer to convey Mr. 
Pett and Mr. Schultz's ownership of Sure-Tech to the Evans and/or others. 
Based on Evans' perjured testimony and based on his mistaken belief that 
Evans had timely accepted Mr. Schultz's offer to convey ownership of Sure-Tech to 
Evans, Judge Brian erroneously concluded that Daniels had authority to represent 
Sure-Tech and that he had authority to sign a stipulation dismissing the case. 
Therefore, Judge Brian signed the Order of Dismissal on May 30, 1995. Although the 
Order of Dismissal was signed on May 30, 1995, the Order was not entered into the 
computer until June 28, 1995, and was not placed in the file until July 1995. 
On May 30, 1995, immediately after the hearing, Mr. Guyon wrote Judge Brian a 
letter and included a copy of one of Mr. Schultz's letters of revocation to Evans. 
Another letter sent certified mail to Evans was presented to the Court at a later date. 
Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz had planned to file a motion under Rule 59 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter, "Rule 59"), but because the Order of Dismissal 
was signed and stamped filed May 30, 1995, and Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz did not 
learn that the Order had been signed and stamped filed until June 28, 1995, they could 
not file a motion under Rule 59. Therefore, on June 28, 1995, they filed a Motion under 
8 
Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter, "Rule 60"). In their Rule 60 
Motion, Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz provided documentation proving that Steve Evans 
lied under oath at the May 30, 1995 hearing. They also provided documentation 
proving that only Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz were ever the owners of Sure-Tech. 
Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz filed their Notice of Appeal on July 30, 1995, and on 
August 9, 1995, Judge Brain signed a "Court Ruling" denying Mr. Pett's and Mr. 
Schultz's Rule 60 Motion. 
(C) 
DISPOSITION OF CASE AT TRIAL COURT 
Sure-Tech's Complaint against the Defendants was dismissed after a "motion" 
hearing turned evidentiary hearing, in which Steve Evans committed perjury and 
claimed that he never received any letters from Mr. Schultz withdrawing his offer to 
convey Mr. Pett's and his own ownership of Sure-Tech to Evans and/or others. Mr. 
Pett and Mr. Schultz then appealed to the Supreme Court which in turn assigned the 
case to this Court. 
(D) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Sure-Tech L.L.C., (hereinafter, "Sure-Tech") was formed on February 14, 
1993, by Robert J. Pett and Charles A. Schultz. (Record at pages 1312-1314) 
2. The only members of Sure-Tech are Robert J. Pett and Charles A. Schultz. 
See the Affidavits of Robert J. Pett and Charles A. Schultz. (Record at pages 1308-
1311, 1336-1338) See also the Operating Agreement for Sure-Tech (Record at page 
1316-1331); the 1993 Annual Report for Sure-Tech (Record at page 1332); a copy of the 
1994 Annual Report for Sure-Tech (Record at page 1334); the Minutes of the Initial 
Meeting of Sure-Tech (Record at page 1315); the Minutes of the First Annual Meeting 
of Sure-Tech (Record at page 1333); and the Minutes of the Second Annual Meeting of 
Sure-Tech (Record at page 1335). 
3. Sure-Tech a twenty percent (20%) limited partner of EML Projects LTD, 
(hereinafter, "EML"), filed a complaint in this matter on April 11, 1994, seeking a 
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dissolution of EML (Record at page 2). 
4. Charles Schultz represented Sure-Tech in the law suit. Callister 
represented the Defendants in the law suit. (Record at pages 2, 90). 
5. Various motions were filed in the case and some discovery was 
attempted. (Record at page 300) 
6. On or about May 3, 1994, Callister filed a Motion to Disqualify Mr. 
Schultz as counsel for Sure-Tech, claiming that Mr. Schultz had represented Sure-
Tech in the past on the same issue. (Record at page 96) 
7. On May 20, 1994, Sure-Tech filed a Motion to Disqualify Callister, 
asserting that Callister, as corporate counsel for EML, could not represent EML 
against Sure-Tech, a limited partner, in the dissolution proceeding. (Record at page 
1263A). 
8. Both motions were eventually heard in November 1994, and both Mr. 
Schultz and Callister were disqualified from the case. (Record at page 1174) 
9. Purporting to act on behalf of Sure-Tech, Scott Daniels (hereinafter, 
"Daniels") signed a Stipulation for Dismissal of the case on or about April 21, 1995. 
(Record at page 1252). 
10. On or about April 24, 1995, Daniels filed an appearance in the case 
claiming to represent Sure-Tech. (Record at page 1256) 
11. Richard Nebeker entered an appearance for EML on or about April 24, 
1995. (Record at page 1254). 
12. Mr. Schultz wrote to Judge Brian on April 26, 1995, informing him that 
Daniels did not represent Sure-Tech and that Daniels had no authority to represent 
Sure-Tech in this case. (Record at page 1258). 
13. Daniels then requested a hearing to determine who had authority to 
represent Sure-Tech. (Record at page 1261). 
14. A "Motion Hearing" was scheduled for one half hour on May 30, 1995, at 
9:00 a.m. on Daniels's request. (Record at page 1290). 
15. At that hearing, in contrast to the Notice from the tried court, evidence 
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was taken and witnesses testified. (Transcript at pages 2-71). 
16. At the hearing Steve Evans testified and falsely claimed he and his 
family members were owners of Sure-Tech. (Transcript at pages 3-6, 8). 
17. At the hearing Steve Evans claimed that Mr. Schultz had sent Evans a 
letter offering to convey Mr. Pett's and Mr. Schultz's ownership of Sure-Tech to the 
Evanses. (Transcript at page 11). 
18. Steve Evans also falsely claimed that he had never received any letter 
from Mr. Schultz withdrawing the offer to convey ownership of Sure-Tech to Evans. 
(Transcript at page 29) 
19. Mr. Schultz testified at the May 30, 1995 hearing, stating that the only 
members of Sure-Tech were himself and Mr. Pett. (Transcript at page 57) 
20. Mr. Schultz also testified that he had sent Evans a letter revoking any 
offer to convey ownership of Sure-Tech to the Evanses, but informed the tried court that 
he did not have a copy of the letter at the hearing because he thought, based on the 
court's notice, that the hearing was a motion hearing not an evidentiary hearing. 
(Transcript at pages 27, 59-60). 
21. In addition to the letter of November 22, 1994 letter, informing Evans that 
Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz would not convey Sure-Tech to Evans, Mr. Schultz sent Evans 
a letter dated December 22, 1994, wherein he again told Evans that Mr. Pett and Mr. 
Schultz would not transfer ownership of Sure-Tech to Evans or his family. Both letters 
were sent certified mail. (Record at pages 1302, 1493). 
22. Mr. Schultz further testified thcrt neither Evans nor any of his family had 
ever owned any interest in Sure-Tech. (Record at page 57, 60) 
23. At the May 30, 1995 hearing, the tried court received into evidence the 
Articles of Organization of Sure-Tech showing that Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz were the 
only members and managers of Sure-Tech. (Record at page 1298). 
24. At the May 30, 1995 hearing, the trial court also received into evidence 
the Annual Reports for Sure-Tech showing thcrt the only members and managers of 
Sure-Tech were Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz. (Record at page 1298). 
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25. At the May 30, 1995 hearing, the tried court also received into evidence 
the Operating Agreement of Sure-Tech stating that the only members of Sure-Tech 
were Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz. (Record at page 1298). 
26. Ed Guyon represented Mr. Pett, Mr. Schultz and Sure-Tech at the May 
30, 1995 hearing. (Transcript at page 2). 
27. Daniels represented Steve Evans and Sure-Tech at the May 30, 1995 
hearing. (Transcript at page 2) 
28. Mr. Guyon was only retained the morning of the hearing and only had 15 
minutes to prepare for the hearing. (Record at page 1337). 
29. Mr. Schultz only learned of the hearing on May 26, 1995. (Record at 
page 1336). 
30. The issue of whether or not a letter revoking Mr. Schultz's offer to convey 
ownership of Sure-Tech to Evans had been sent became of concern to the trial court, 
and Mr. Guyon asked the court for a few minutes to send someone to get a copy of the 
letter, but the court refused Mr. Guyon's request. Nonetheless, someone was sent to 
get a copy of the letter revoking the offer to convey ownership of Sure-Tech to Evans, 
but he did not arrive with the letter until five minutes after the hearing had concluded. 
(Transcript at page 50) 
31. Mr. Guyon attempted to call Lisa Spivey to testify that a certified letter 
was sent to Steve Evans revoking the offer to convey Mr. Pett's and Mr. Schultz's 
ownership of Sure-Tech to the Evanses, but Judge Brian refused to let her testify. 
(Transcript at page 55) 
32. Mr. Guyon then proffered her testimony to the court, stating that she had 
personally mailed a letter revoking the offer to convey Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz's 
ownership of Sure-Tech to the Evanses. (Transcript at page 56) 
33. Based on Evans' perjured testimony and based on his mistaken belief 
that Evans had timely accepted Mr. Schultz's offer to convey ownership of Sure-Tech 
to Evans, Judge Brian erroneously concluded that Daniels had authority to represent 
Sure-Tech and that he had authority to sign a stipulation dismissing the case. 
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Therefore, Judge Brian signed the Order of Dismissal on May 30, 1995. Although the 
Order of Dismissal was signed on May 30, 1995, the Order was not entered into the 
computer until June 28, 1995, and was not placed in the file until July 1995. (Record at 
page 1297). 
34. Daniels was then instructed by Judge Brian to prepare detailed findings 
and conclusions of the May 30, 1995 hearing and to submit them to the court by June 
9, 1995. However, Daniels never submitted any findings or conclusions to the court, 
although he did prepare some proposed findings and conclusions which were 
objected to by Mr. Guyon. (Record at page 1296). 
35. On May 30, 1995, immediately after the hearing, Mr. Guyon wrote Judge 
Brian a letter and included a copy of one of Mr. Schultz's letters of revocation to 
Evans. (Record at pages 1299-1304). 
36. Daniels latter admitted that he had in his possession at the May 30, 1995 
hearing one of the letters to Evans withdrawing Mr. Schultz's offer to convey 
ownership of Sure-Tech to Evans or others. (Record at page 1305). 
37. On June 28, 1995, Judge Noel signed an order extending the time for Mr. 
Pett and Mr. Schultz to appeal the dismissal of this case until July 30, 1995. (Record at 
page 1381-1382). 
38. Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz had planned to file a motion under of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter, "Rule 59"), but because the Order of Dismissal 
was signed and stamped filed May 30, 1995, and Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz did not 
learn that the Order had been signed and stamped filed until June 28, 1995, they could 
not file a motion under Rule 59. Therefore, on June 28, 1995, they filed a Motion under 
Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter, "Rule 60"). (Record at page 
1368). 
39. In their Rule 60 Motion, Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz provided documentation 
proving that Steve Evans lied under oath at the May 30, 1995 hearing. They also 
provided documentation proving that only Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz were ever the 
owners of Sure-Tech. (Record at pages 1300-1357). 
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40. Evans and Daniels never opposed Mr. Pett's and Mr. Schultz's Rule 60 
Motion. (Record at page 1389-1390). 
41. Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz filed their Notice of Appeal on July 30, 1995. 
(Record at page 1404-1405). 
42. On August 9, 1995, Judge Brain signed a "Court Ruling" denying Mr. Pett's 
and Mr. Schultz's Rule 60 Motion. (Record at page 1427). 
43. On August 29, 1996, Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz filed an Amended Notice of 
Appeal. (Record at page 1434). 
* The transcript of the May 30,1995 hearing was not paginated at the time this 
brief was prepared. 
VIII 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The tried court erred both as a matter of fact and as a matter of law when it 
concluded that Evans and/or his then counsel of record had authority to dismiss the 
complaint in this matter. The trial court erred as a matter of fact in concluding that 
Mr. Schultz's offer to convey ownership of Sure-Tech to the Evans and/or others was 
not withdrawn. The trial court further erred both as a matter of fact and as a matter of 
law in not allowing Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz time to obtain the letters sent to Evans 
withdrawing the offer to convey ownership of Sure-Tech to Evans and/or others. The 
tried court also erred as a matter of law in not permitting Ms. Spivey to testify that 
letters had been sent to Evans withdrawing Mr. Schultz's offer to convey ownership of 
Sure-Tech to Evans. 
The tried court again erred as a matter of law in denying Mr. Pett's and Mr. 
Schultz's Rule 60(b) Motion after Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz provided the court with 
proof that Mr. Schultz had sent letters to Evans withdrawing his offer to convey 
ownership of Sure-Tech to Evans or others, and that Evans lied at the May 30, 1995 
hearing. 
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IX 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BOTH AS A MATTER OF FACT AND AS A MATTER 
OF LAW IN CONCLUDING THAT EVANS, AND/OR HIS THEN ATTORNEY 
DANIELS, HAD AUTHORITY TO DISMISS THIS CASE. THE TRIAL COURT 
FURTHER ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN DENYING MR. PETT'S AND MR. 
SCHULTZ'S RULE 60 (b) MOTION 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BOTH AS A MATTER OF FACT AND AS A MATTER LAW 
WHEN IT BASED ITS DECISION TO PERMIT EVANS TO DISMISS THIS ACTION ON 
EVANS PERJURED TESTIMONY. 
The indisputable facts of this case prove thcrt Evans lied under oath when he 
claimed that he never received any letter from Mr. Schultz withdrawing the offer from 
Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz to convey ownership of Sure-Tech to Evans or others. 
(Record crt pages 1336-1340, 1491). Evans was sent not only one letter withdrawing 
the offer to convey ownership of Sure-Tech to Evans, but two letters. (Record at pages 
1302, 1491). The trial court improperly and unreasonably ignored Mr. Schultz's 
testimony that the offer to convey ownership of Sure-Tech to Evans and/or others. The 
trial court also improperly and unreasonably relied on Evans' perjured testimony that 
he had never received any letters withdrawing the offer to convey ownership of Sure-
Tech. The trial court's conclusion was clearly erroneous. The trial court also 
improperly and unreasonably precluded Mr. Schultz from obtaining the letters 
proving that Evans was lying crt the hearing. The hearing was scheduled for a 
"motion" hearing not a evidentiary hearing. The decision not to allow Mr. Schultz to 
obtain copies of the letters sent to Evans was likewise clearly improper and 
erroneous. 
It is not surprising that Evans perjured himself at the May 30, 1995 hearing. 
Evans has a history of lying. He was fired by EML one of the Defendants in this case 
for "Dishonesty" (Record crt pages 1355-1357) and was scheduled for a perjury hearing 
before Judge Frederick in another case but avoided the hearing when the case was 
dismissed. (Record at page 1375). 
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Because the undisputable and irrefutable evidence proves that Evans, a 
pathological liar, perjured himself at the May 30, 1995 hearing, the trial court 
committed prejudicial and reversible error when it chose to ignore Mr. Schultz's 
testimony that Evans had been sent letters withdrawing the offer to convey Sure-Tech. 
Therefore, this Court must reverse the tried court's decision and direct the tried court to 
enter a ruling declaring that no one other than Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz have or ever 
had any authority to act on behalf of Sure-Tech. 
POINT II 
BECAUSE THE EVANSES NEVER HAD ANY OWNERSHIP INTEREST IN SURE-TECH 
AND BECAUSE MR. PETT AND MR. SCHULTZ NEVER CONVEYED ANY OWNERSHIP 
OF SURE-TECH TO THE EVANS AND/OR OTHERS, THE EVANSES NEVER HAD ANY 
AUTHORITY TO ACT ON BEHALF OF SURE-TECH AND TO DISMISS THIS CASE. 
It is an indisputable fact that neither Evans nor any member of his family ever 
had any ownership interest in Sure-Tech. The indisputable evidence is that only Mr. 
Pett and Mr. Schultz were and are the owners of Sure-Tech. Because, only Mr. Pett 
and Mr. Schultz were and are the only members and/or managers of Sure-Tech, 
neither Evans nor any member of his family or extended family has or had any 
authority to act on behalf of Sure-Tech and to dismiss this case. No one other than 
Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz had or have authority to act on behalf of Sure-Tech. 
Under express and controlling Utah law members may only be added to a 
limited liability company in accordance with the articles of organization, the 
operating agreement and/or the Utah Code. Utah Code §48-2b-122 specifies that new 
members may only be added to an LLC in accordance with the terms of the operating 
agreement if the operating agreement contains a provision for adding new members. 
If the operating agreement does not contain a provision for adding new members, 
then new members may only be added with the written consent of all members of the 
LLC. 
The Operating Agreement of Sure-Tech specifies that new members may only 
be added with the written consent of all members of Sure-Tech. (Record at page 
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1328, Article 12.3). Because Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz never signed any written 
document agreeing to add the Evanses or anyone else as members of Sure-Tech, 
under clear and controlling Utah law, the Evanses cannot claim that they ever were 
members of Sure-Tech or ever had any authority to act on behalf of Sure-Tech. The 
Operating Agreement of Sure-Tech was signed after the Articles of Organization were 
filed. The Evanses are not listed as members or managers of Sure-Tech in the 
Articles of Organization, and the Evanses are not listed as members or managers in 
the Operating Agreement of Sue-Tech. (Record at pages 1312-1314,1316-1331). 
Therefore, under clear and controlling Utah law, the Evanses never had any 
ownership interest in Sure-Tech or any authority to act on behalf of Sure-Tech. 
Even if Evans had testified truthfully, and Mr. Schultz had not withdrawn his 
offer to convey ownership of Sure-Tech to Evans and/or others he designated, neither 
Evans nor any other member of his family had any authority to act on behalf of Sure-
Tech. Assuming arguendo that Evans had timely accepted Mr. Schultz's offer to 
convey ownership of Sure-Tech to Evans, it is still an undisputed fact that Mr. Schultz 
and Mr. Pett never conveyed their ownership of Sure-Tech to the Evanses. (Transcript 
at page 12). Therefore, if the Evanses wished to hold Mr. Schultz to his offer to convey 
ownership of Sure-Tech to them, they had to file suit to force Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz 
to convey their ownership of Sure-Tech to them. They failed to do so and, therefore, 
had no authority to act on behalf of Sure-Tech and to dismiss this case. 
The fact that the Evanses never had any ownership of Sure-Tech is further 
demonstrated in their letter of November 16, 1994 from Fred Evans and Beatrice Evans 
to P. Bryan Fishbum. (Record at page 1345) In that letter, signed by both Fred Evans 
and Beatrice Evans, both state that they are not permitted to "speak for Sure-Tech but 
have talked to Charles Schultz and he has assured us he will go along with our 
suggested offer." Both Mr. and Mrs. Evans then state in paragraph 3 of the letter that: 
"Sure-Tech, Charles Schultz and Robert Pett shall be paid $50,000 dollars in return, 
will return their 20% interest in EMLP." (Emphasis added). If Evans claimed at the 
May 30, 1995 hearing that his mother and his father were members of Sure-Tech and 
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had the controlling interest in Sure-Tech, why did Mr. and Mrs. Evans need Mr. Pett 
and Mr. Schultz to "go along with" their suggested offer? Why did the Evanses not 
simply make the offer on their own if they owned and controlled Sure-Tech? If the 
Evanses owned any part of Sure-Tech, as Evans falsely claimed at the May 30, 1995 
hearing, why were Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz to be paid $50,000.00 for their 20% interest 
in Sure-Tech? How much were the Evanses to be paid for their alleged interest in 
Sure-Tech? If Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz owned 20% of EMLP, how could the Evanses 
claim to own any of Sure-Tech when Sure-Tech only owned 20% of EMLP and all of 
that 20% was owned by Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz? 
The tried court erred both as a matter of fact and as a matter of law when it 
concluded thcrt Evans and/or anyone other than Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz had authority 
to act on behalf of Sure-Tech. That err was prejudicial and reversible. Therefore, the 
trial court's order dismissing this case must be reversed. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN NOT ALLOWING MR. 
SCHULTZ TIME TO GET THE LETTERS SENT TO EVANS PROVING THAT MR. 
SCHULTZ HAD WITHDRAWN HIS OFFER TO CONVEY OWNERSHIP OF SURE-TECH 
TO EVANS OR OTHERS. 
The May 30, 1995 hearing was scheduled as a "motion" hearing. (Record at 
page 1290). Mr. Schultz only received notice of the hearing on May 26, 1994. (Record 
at page 1337). Mr. Guyon only learned of the hearing on Monday, May 30, 1995 
approximcrtely 15 minutes prior to the hearing. (Record at page 1336-1337). 
Beccmse neither Mr. Guyon nor Mr. Schultz had any notice that the hearing 
was an evidentiary hearing rather than a motion hearing, as the Notice of Hearing 
stated, Mr. Schultz did not have all of the relevant documents with him crt the hearing. 
When Evans committed perjury, clciiming that he never received any letter from Mr. 
Schultz withdrawing the offer to convey to Evans the ownership of Sure-Tech, Mr. 
Guyon and Mr. Schultz recjuested time to get the letters proving that the offer had 
been withdrcrwn, the tried court improperly denied Mr. Guyon and Mr. Schultz' request, 
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even though it would have only taken twenty minutes to get the letters. (Transcript at 
pages 49, 60). The denial of Mr. Guyon's and Mr. Schultz's request for twenty to thirty 
minutes to obtain copies of the letters sent to Evans withdrawing the offer to convey 
ownership of Sure-Tech to Evans and/or others was clearly an abuse of the trial 
court's discretion, given the fact that the hearing was scheduled for a motion hearing 
rather than an evidentiary hearing. That denial was prejudicial and reversible and, 
therefore, the trial court's order permitting Evans to dismiss this action must be 
reversed. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT 
PRECLUDED MS. SPIVEY FROM TESTIFYING THAT SHE HAD PERSONALLY 
PLACED IN THE UNITED STATES MAIL A LETTER TO EVANS WITHDRAWING THE 
OFFER FROM MR. SCHULTZ CONVEYING OWNERSHIP OF SURE-TECH TO EVANS 
OR OTHERS. 
In a remarkable abuse of discretion, the trial court precluded Ms. Spivey, Mr. 
Schultz's para-legal, from testifying that she had personally placed in the United 
States mail a letter to Evans from Mr. Schultz withdrawing Mr. Schultz's previous offer 
to convey ownership of Sure-Tech to Evans and/or others. The trial court precluded 
Ms. Spivey^ testimony based on a best evidence objection, Utah Rules of Evidence, 
Rule 1004. The best evidence rule does not preclude a person from testifying that the 
person mailed the document. It may preclude a person from testifying as to the 
contents of the document, unless the whereabouts of the original is explained, but it 
does not preclude a person from testifying that a document was mailed to an 
individual. The trial court's ruling precluding Ms. Spivey from testifying that she had 
sent a letter to Evans from Mr. Schultz withdrawing his previous offer to convey 
ownership of Sure-Tech to Evans or others, was a clear abuse of discretion and, 
therefore, must be reversed. 
The tried court's ruling precluding Ms. Spivey's testimony is even a more 
egregious breach of discretion because Evans attorney, Daniels, later admitted that 
he had one of the letters Evans swore under oath he never received, in his file at the 
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May 30, 1995 hearing. (Record at page 1305). 
The tried courts refusal to permit Ms. Spivey to testify that she personally mailed 
to Evans a letter from Mr. Schultz withdrawing his offer to convey ownership of Sure-
Tech to Evans and/or others was prejudicial and reversible error. Therefore, the trial 
court's order of dismissal must be reversed. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT 
DENIED MR. PETT'S AND MR. SCHULTZ'S RULE 60(b) MOTION. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the trial court did not error in its initial ruling at 
the May 30, 1995 hearing, it committed prejudicial and reversible error when it denied 
Mr. Pett's and Mr. Schultz's Rule 60 (b) Motion. In their Rule 60(b) Motion Mr. Pett and 
Mr. Schultz provided the tried court with irrefutable proof that Mr. Schultz had sent 
Evans a letter withdrawing the offer to convey ownership of Sure-Tech to Evans. 
(Record at pages 1306, 1336-1340). Not only was Evans sent one letter withdrawing 
the offer to convey ownership of Sure-Tech, he was sent two letters, and both letters 
were sent before Evans attempted to accept Mr. Schultz's offer to convey ownership of 
Sure-Tech to Evans and/or others, and both letters were sent certified mail. (Record 
at pages 1339-1340, 1491). 
Evans did not even oppose Mr. Pett's and Mr. Schultz's Rule 60(b) Motion, and 
he did not attempt to contradict Mr. Pett's and Mr. Schultz's proof that he had been 
sent and received letters withdrawing Mr. Schultz's offer to convey Sure-Tech to Evans 
and/or others. Evans did not attempt to do so because he could not do so. His 
attorney had in his file at the May 30, 1995 hearing a copy of a letter from Mr. Schultz 
withdrawing his offer to convey ownership of Sure-Tech to Evans or others specified 
by Evans. 
The trial court's denial of Mr. Pett's and Mr. Schultz's Rule 60 (b) Motion was 
clearly erroneous as a matter of fact, as Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz proved beyond any 
doubt that Evans had perjured himself at the May 30, 1995 hearing and proved 
20 
beyond any doubt that Mr. Schultz had withdrawn the offer to convey ownership of 
Sure-Tech to Evans or others prior to the time Evans attempted to accept the offer. 
The trial court's denial of Mr. Pett's and Mr. Schultz's Rule 60(b) Motion was also 
clearly erroneous because Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz proved beyond any doubt that 
none of the Evanses were ever members of Sure-Tech and under Utah law had no 
authority to act on behalf of Sure-Tech. 
The tried court's denied of Mr. Pett's and Mr. Schultz's Rule 60(b) Motion was 
prejudicial and reversible. Therefore, this Court must reverse the tried court's order 
dismissing this case and direct the tried court to enter an order declaring that only Mr. 
Pett and Mr. Schultz have authority to act on behalf of Sure-Tech and that only Mr. 
Pett and Mr. Schultz have ever had authority to act on behalf of Sure-Tech. 
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CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
The clear and undisputable evidence is that none of the Evanses have, or have 
ever had, any ownership interest in Sure-Tech. The undisputable evidence also 
proves that Steve Evans perjured himself crt the May 30, 1995 hearing before Judge 
Brian when he testified under oath that he never received any letters from Mr. Schultz 
withdrawing Mr. Schultz's previous offer to convey ownership of Sure-Tech to Evans or 
others. 
The tried court committed prejudicial cmd reversible error when it permitted 
Evans and/or his then counsel of record, Scott Daniels, to dismiss this matter. The 
trial court also committed prejudicial and reversible error when it precluded Ms. 
Spivey from testifying crt the May 30, 1995 hearing in this matter. The trial court further 
committed prejudicial and reversible error when it denied Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz's 
Rule 60(b) Motion. 
WHEREFORE, Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz respectfully request that this Court 
reverse the tried court's decision permitting Evans and/or Daniels to dismiss this case 
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and enter instructions to the tried court to enter an order declaring that the Evanses do 
not no have, or have ever had, any ownership interest in Sure-Tech. 
Dated this <~s day of January 1997. 
Charles A. Schultz 
Attorney for Robert J. Pett and Pro Se 
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Utah Code Annotcrted 1953, a s amended, §78-2-2(3)(j) 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, a s amended, §78-2-2(4) 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, a s amended, §48-2b-105 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, a s amended, §48-2b-l 19 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, a s amended, §48-2b-122 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, a s amended, §48-2b-125 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, a s amended, §48-2b-12S 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, a s amended, §48-2b-i31 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, a s amended, §48-2b-135 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 301 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 1004 
Articles of Organization for Sure-Tech, LLC. 
Operating Agreement for Sure-Tech, pages 1-3, 13-16, 
Minutes of Initial Meeting of Sure-Tech 
Minutes of First Annual Meeting of Sure-Tech 
Minutes of Second Annual Meeting of Sure-Tech 
1993 Annual Report of Sure-Tech 
1994 Annual Report for Sure-Tech 
Affidavit of Robert J. Pert 
Affidavit of Lisa Spivey 
Affidavit of Charles A. Schultz 
Certified letter of November 22, 1994 to Steve Evans 
Certified letter of December 22, 1994 to Steve Evans 
November 16, 1994 letter from Fred and Beatrice Evans to P. Bryan Fishburn 
Limited Partnership Agreement of EML, page 2 
April 26, 1995 letter to Judge Brian from Charles Schultz 
Notice of Hearing 
Transcript of May 30, 1995 hearing pages 3-4, 8-9, 17-19, 21-22, 27, 29, 53-56, 57-60, 69 
Order of Dismissal 
June 7, 1995 letter from Scott Daniels to Edwin Guyon 
Notice of Appeal 
Amended Notice of Appeal 
Minute entry denying Motion to Vacate 
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CHAPTER 2 
SUPREME COURT 
Action 
78-2-1. Number of justices — Terras — Chief justice and 
associate chief justice — Selection and func-
tions. 
TS-2-1.5, 78-2-1.6. Repealed. 
73-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
75-2-3. Repealed. 
75-2-4. Supreme Court — Rulemaking, judges pro tem-
pore, and practice of law. 
78-2-5. Repealed. 
75-2-6. Appellate court administrator. 
78-2-7. Repealed. 
78-2-7.5. Service of sheriff to court. 
78-2-8 to 78-2-14. Repealed. 
78-2-1. Number of justices — Terms — Chief justice 
and associate chief just ice — Selection and 
functions. 
(1) The Supreme Court consists of five justices. 
(2) A justice of the Supreme Court shall be appointed 
initially to serve until the first general election held more than 
diree years after the effective date of the appointment. There-
after, the term of office of a justice of the Supreme Court is ten 
years and commences on the first Monday in January follow-
ing the date of election. A justice whose term expires may 
serve upon request of the Judicial Council until a successor is 
appointed and qualified. 
(3) The justices of the Supreme Court shall elect a chief 
justice from among the members of the court by a majority 
vote of all justices. The term of the office of chief justice is four 
years. The chief justice may serve successive terms. The chief 
justice may resign from the office of chief justice without 
resigning from the Supreme Court. The chief justice may be 
removed from the office of chief justice by a majority vote of all 
justices of the Supreme Court. 
(4 J If the justices are unable to elect a chief justice within 30 
days of a vacancy in that office, the associate chief justice shall 
act as chief justice until a chief justice is elected under this 
section. If the associate chief justice is unable or unwilling to 
act as chief justice, the most senior justice shall act as chief 
justice until a chief justice is elected under this section. 
(5) In addition to the chief justice's duties as a member of 
the Supreme Court, the chief justice has duties as provided by 
law. 
(6) There is created the office of associate chief justice. The 
term of office of the associate chief justice is two years . The 
associate chief justice may serve in t ha t office no more than 
too successive terms. The associate chief justice shall be 
elected by a majority vote of the members of the Supreme 
Court and shall be allocated duties as the chief justice deter-
g e s . If the chief justice is absent or otherwise unable to 
serve, the associate chief justice shall serve as chief justice. 
The chief justice may delegate responsibilities to the associate 
^ ief justice as consistent with law. 1990 
78-2-1.5,78-2-1.6. R e p e a l e d . 1971,1981 
'8-2-2. S u p r e m e Court j u r i s d i c t i o n . 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer 
questions of state law certified by a court of the United States. 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all 
^traordinary writs and authority to issue all writs ana 
Process necessary to carry into effect its orders, judgments, 
^ d decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction. 
13) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including 
Jurisdiction of interlocutor}-' appeals, o\ er. 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of 
Appeals prior to final judgment by the Court of Appeals; 
(c) discipline of lawyers; 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative 
proceedings originating with: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(ii) the State Tax Commission; 
(iii) the School and Institutional Trust Lands 
Board of Trustees; 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; 
(v) the state engineer; or 
(vi) the executive director of the Department of 
Natural Resources reviewing actions of the Division 
of Sovereign Lands and Forestry; 
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review 
of informal adjudicative proceedings of agencies under 
Subsection (e); 
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record 
holding a statute of the United States or this state 
unconstitutional on its face under the Constitution of the 
United States or the Utah Constitution; 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in-
volving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction 
of a first degree or capital felony; 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of 
record over which the Court of Appeals does not have 
original appellate jurisdiction; and 
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments, 
or decrees ruling on legislative subpoenas. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Ap-
peals any of the matters over which the Supreme Court has 
original appellate jurisdiction, except: 
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an inter-
locutory order of a court of record involving a charge of a 
capital felony; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; 
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and 
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) 
through (d). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or 
denying a petition for writ of certiorari for the review of a 
Court of Appeals adjudication, but the Supreme Court shall 
review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals under 
Subsection (3)(b). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements 
of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its review of agency adjudicative 
proceedings. 1995 
78-2-3. Repea led . 1986 
78-2-4. Supreme Court — R u l e m a k i n g , j u d g e s pro tem-
pore, a n d pract ice of law. 
(1) The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and 
evidence for use in the courts of the state and shall by rule 
manage the appellate process. The Legislature may amend 
the rules of procedure and evidence adopted by the Supreme 
Court upon a vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses 
of the Legislature. 
(2) Except as otherwise provided by the Utah Constitution, 
the Supreme Court by rule may authorize retired justices and 
judges and judges pro tempore to perform any judicial duties. 
Judges pro tempore shall be citizens of the United States, 
Utah residents, and admitted to practice law in Utah. 
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(b) an attorney granted the authority to practice law by 
the Supreme Court of the state of Utah as provided in 
Title 78, Chapter 51; 
(c) a chiropractor holding a license under Title 58, 
Chapter 12, Part 7, Chiropractic Improvements Act, and 
any subsequent laws regulating the practice of chiroprac-
tic; 
(d) a doctor of dentistry holding a license under Title 
58, Chapter 7, Dentists and Dental Hygienists Act, and 
any subsequent laws regulating the practice of dentistry; 
(e) a professional engineer registered under Title 58, 
Chapter 22, Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors 
Licensing Act; 
(f) a naturopath holding a license under Title 5S; 
Chapter 12, Part 3. and any subsequent laws regulating 
the practice of naturopathy; 
(g) a nurse whose professional nursing license desig-
nates him as a nurse anesthetist pursuant to Subsection 
58-31-9.1(1): 
(h) an optometrist holding a licen^f under Title 58, 
Chapter 16a, and any subsequent "laws regulating the 
practice of optometry" 
(i) an osteopathic physician or surgeon holding a li-
cense under Title 58, Chapter 12, Pan 1, Osteopathic 
Medicine Licensing Act, and any subsequent laws regu-
lating the practice of osteopathy; 
(j) a pharmacist holding a license under Title 56, 
Chapter 17, Pharmacy Practice Act, and any subsequent 
laws regulating the practice of pharmacy; 
(k) a physician, surgeon, or doctor of medicine holding 
a license under Title 58, Chapter 12, Part 5, Medical 
Practice Act, and any subsequent laws regulating the 
practice of medicine; 
(1) a physical therapist holding a license under Title 58, 
Chapter 24a, Physical Therapy Practice Act, and any 
subsequent laws regulating the practice of physical ther-
apy, 
(m) a podiatrist holding a license under Title 58, Chap-
ter 5, and any subsequent laws regulating the practice of 
chiropody; 
(n) a psychologist holding a license under Title 58, 
Chapter 25a, Psychologists Licensing Act, and any subse-
quent laws regulating the practice of psychology; 
(o) a public accountant holding a license under Title 58, 
Chapter 26, Certified Public Accountant Licensing Act, 
and any subsequent laws regulating the practice of public 
accounting; 
(p) a real estate broker or real estate agent holding a 
license under Title 61, Chapter 2, and any subsequent 
laws regulating the sale, exchange, purchase, rental, or 
leasing of real estate; 
(q) a clinical or certified social worker holding a license 
under Title 58, Chapter 35, and any subsequent laws 
regulating the practice of social wrork; and 
(r) a veterinarian holding a license under Title 58, 
Chapter 28, Veterinary Practice Act, and any subsequent 
laws regulating the practice of veterinary medicine. 
(8) "Regulating board" means the board organized pursuant 
to state law which is charged with the licensing and regulation 
of the practice of the profession which a limited liability 
company is organized to render. 
(9) "State" means a state, territory, or possession of the 
United States, the District of Columbia, or the Commonwealth 
of Puerto Rico. 
(10) "Successor limited liability company' means the sur-
viving or resulting limited liability company existing pursuant 
to a merger or consolidation cf fvo or mrre limited liability 
companies. i«*2 
48-2b-103. Formation. 
Two or more persons may form a limited liability company 
by executing and delivering to the division articles of organi-
zation for the limited liability company. An interest of a 
member in a limited liability company is personal property. 
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48-2b-104. Scope. 
Except as otherwise provided by the laws of this state, a 
limited liability company may conduct or promote any lawful 
business or purpose which a partnership, general corporation, 
or professional corporation may conduct or promote. i&9i 
48-2b-105. Powers. 
(1) Each limited liability company organized and existing 
under this chapter may: 
(a) sue or be sued, or institute or defend any action, 
arbitration, or proceeding, whether judicial, administra-
tive, or otherwise, in its own name; 
(b) purchase, take, receive, lease, or otherwise acquire, 
own, hold, improve, use, or otherwise deal in or with real 
or personal property or an interest in real or personal 
property, wherever situated; 
(c) sell, convey, mortgage, pledge, create a security 
interest inr iease. exchange or transfer, or otherwise 
dispose of ali or any part of its property or assets; 
(d) lend money to and otherwise assist its employees 
and managers; 
(e) purchase, take, receive, subscribe for, or otherwise 
acquire, own, hold, vote, use, employ, sell, mortgage, lend, 
pledge, otherwise dispose of, or otherwise use or deal in or 
with: 
(i) shares or other interests in or obligations of 
other foreign or domestic limited liability companies, 
domestic or foreign corporations, associations, gen-
eral or limited partnerships, or individuals; or 
(ii) direct or indirect obligations of the United 
States or any other government, state, territory, 
governmental district, or municipality or of any in-
strumentality of them; 
(f) make contracts or guarantees or incur liabilities, 
borrow money at such rates of interest as the limited 
liability company may determine, issue its notes, bonds, 
or other obligations, or secure any of its obligations by 
mortgage or pledge of all or any part of its property, 
franchises, and income; 
(g) lend money for any lawful purpose, invest or rein-
vest its funds, or take and hold real or personal property 
as security for the payment of funds so loaned or invested; 
(h) conduct its business and maintain offices and exer-
cise the powers granted by this chapter within or without 
this state, in any state, territory, district, or possession of 
the United States or in any foreign country; 
(i) elect or appoint managers and agents of the limited 
liability company, define their duties, and fix their com-
pensation; 
(j) make end alter an operating agreement, not incon-
sistent with its articles of organization or with the laws of 
this state, for the administration and regulation of its 
affairs; 
(k) make donations for the public welfare or for chari-
table, scientific, ieligious, or educational purposes; 
(1) indemnify a member or manager or any other per-
son to the same extent that a partnership may indemnify 
any of the partners, managers, employees, or agents of the 
partnership against expenses actually and reasonably 
incurred by the member or manager in connection with 
the defense of an action, suit, or proceeding, whstner civil 
or cr:rr.:nal, ir. wr.::h the member or manager is made a 
psrty: 
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(m) cease its activities and surrender its certificate of 
organization; 
(n) have and exercise all powers necessary or conve-
nient to effect any or all of the purposes for which the 
company is organized; 
(o) t ransact any lawful business which the members or 
the managers find to be in aid of governmental policy; 
(p) pay pensions and establish pension plans, profit-
sharing plans, and other incentive plans for any or all of 
its managers and employees; 
(q) be a promoter, incorporator, general partner, lim-
ited partner, member, associate, or manager of any corpo-
ration, partnership, limited partnership, limited liability 
company, joint venture, trust, or other enterprise; and 
(r) render professional services, if each member of a 
limited liability company who renders professional ser-
vices in Utah is licensed or registered to render those 
professional sen-ices pursuant to applicable Utah law. 
(2) A limited liability company organized to render profes-
sional services under this chapter may render only one specific 
type of professional services, and services ancillary to them, 
and may not engage in any business other than rendering the 
professional services which it was organized to render, and 
services ancillary to them. 
(3) A limited liability company organized to render profes-
sional services: 
(a) may include members, managers, and employees 
authorized under the laws of the jurisdiction where they 
reside to provide similar services; 
(b) may render professional services in Utah only 
through its members, managers, and employees who are 
licensed or registered by the s ta te of Utah to render those 
professional services; and 
(c) shall have all of the other powers provided under 
this section. 1991 
48-2b-106. N a m e — Exclus ive r i g h t 
(1) The name of each limited liability company as set forth 
in the articles of organization: 
(a) shall contain the words "limited company,'' "limited 
liability company," "L.C.," or "L.L.C."; 
(b) may not contain the words "association," "corpora-
tion," "incorporated," "limited partnership," "limited," 
"L.P.," "Ltd.," or words or any abbreviation with a similar 
meaning in any other language; and 
(c) may not, without the writ ten consent of the United 
States Olympic Committee, contain the words "Olympic," 
"Olympiad," or "Citius Altius Fortius." 
(2) (a) A person or entity, other than a limited liability 
company formed or registered under this chapter, may not 
use any of the terms "limited liability company," "limited 
company," "L.L.C.," "L.C.," "LLC," or "LC" in its name in 
this state, except tha t any foreign corporation whose 
actual name includes the word "limited" or "Ltd." may use 
its actual name in this s tate if "corporation," "incorpo-
rated," or any abbreviation of these is also used. 
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(a), a limited liabil-
ity partnership may use the terms "limited liability part-
nership," "L.L.P.," or aLLP" in its name. 
(3) Except as authorized by Subsection (4), the name of a 
limited liability company must be distinguishable as defined 
in Subsection (5) upon the records of the division from: 
(a) the name of any limited partnership formed or 
authorized to t ransact business in this state; 
(b) the name of any limited liability company formed or 
authorized to transact business in this state; 
(c) the corporate name of any corporation incorporated 
or authorized to t ransact business in the state; 
(d) any limited partnership name reserved under this 
chapter; 
(e) any limited liability company name reserved under 
this chapter; 
(f) any corporate name reserved under Title 16, Chat>. 
ter 10a, Utah Revised Business Corporation Act a* 
amended, or Title 16, Chapter 6, Utah Nonprofit Corpo-
ration and Cooperative Association Act, as amended* 
(g) any fictitious name adopted by a foreign corpora-
tion, limited partnership, or limited liability company 
authorized to transact business in this state because its 
real name is unavailable; 
(h) any corporate name of a not-for-profit corporation 
incorporated or authorized to transact business in this 
state; and 
(i) any assumed name, t rademark, or service mark 
registered by the division. 
(4) A limited liability company may apply to the division for 
approval to file its articles of organization under or to reserve 
a name tha t is not distinguishable upon the division's records 
from one or more of the names described in Subsection (3). The 
division shall approve the name for which the company 
applies if: 
(a) the other person whose name is not distinguishable 
from the name under which the applicant desires to file 
consents to the filing in writing and submits an undertak-
ing in a form satisfactory to the division to change its 
name to a name that is distinguishable from the name of 
the applicant; or 
(b) the applicant delivers to the division a certified copy 
of the final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction 
establishing the applicant's r ight to use the name in this 
state. 
(5) A name is distinguishable from other names, trade-
marks , and service marks registered with the division if it 
contains one or more different let ters or numerals from other 
names upon the division's records. Differences between singu-
lar and plural forms of words are distinguishing. 
(6) The following differences are not distinguishing: 
(a) the words "corporation," "incorporated," "company," 
' limited partnership," "limited," "L.P.," "Ltd.," "limited 
liabilitj' company," "limited company," "L.C.," "L.L.C.," or 
any abbreviation of these words; 
(b) the presence or absence of the words or symbols of 
the words "the," "and," "a," or "plus"; 
(c) differences in punctuation and special characters; or 
(d) differences in capitalization. 
(7) The director of the division shall have the power and 
authority reasonably necessary to interpret and efficiently 
administer this section and to perform the duties imposed 
upon the division by this section. 
(8) A name t h a t implies tha t a limited liability company is 
an agency of this s ta te or any of its political subdivisions, if it 
is not actually such a legally established agency or subdivi-
sion, may not be approved for filing by the division. 
(9) The exclusive right to a name may be reserved by: 
(a) any person intending to organize a limited liability 
company under this chapter and to adopt that name; 
(b) any limited liability company or any foreign limited 
liability company registered in this state intending to 
adopt that name; 
(c) any foreign limited liability company intending to 
register in this state and intending to adopt that name; 
and 
(d) any person intending to organize a foreign limited 
liability company and intending to have it register in this 
state and adopt that name. 
(10; The reservation shall be made by filing with the 
division an application executed under penalty of penury by 
the applicant to reserve a snec-ficd name. If tne division find? 
that the name is available for use by a limited liability 
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(c) the business purpose or purposes for which the 
limited liability compan3r is organized; 
(d) the street address of its registered office in the state 
and the name, street address, and signature of its initial 
registered agent in the state; 
(e) a statement that the division is appointed the agent 
of the limited liability company for service of process if the 
agent has resigned, the agent's authority has been re-
voked, or the agent cannot be found or served with the 
exercise of reasonable diligence; 
(f) if the limited liability company is to be managed by 
a manager or managers, a statement that the company is 
to be managed in that fashion and the names and street 
addresses of the managers who are to serve until the first 
meeting of members or until their successors are elected; 
(g) if the management of a limited liability company is 
reserved to the members, the names and street addresses 
of the members; and 
vh i any other provision, not inconsistent with law, that 
the members choose to include in the articles of organi-
zation for the regulation of the internal affairs of the 
limited liability company, including any provision that is 
required or permitted to be included in the operating 
agreement of the limited liability company under this 
chapter. 
(2) It is not necessary to include in the articles of organiza-
tion any of the powers enumerated in this chapter. 1992 
4S-2b-117. Fi l ing of art ic les . 
(1) An original and one copy of the articles of organization 
and of any certificates of amendment, or of any judicial decree 
of amendment, shall be delivered to the division. A person who 
executes a certificate of amendment as an attorney-in-fact or 
fiduciary need not exhibit evidence of his authority as a 
prerequisite to filing. Unless it finds that the articles of 
organization do not conform to law as to their form, the 
division, upon receipt of all filing fees established under 
Section 63-38-3.2, shall: 
(a) place a stamp or seal on the original and the copy, 
indicating the time, day, month, and year of the filing, the 
name of the division, the signature of the division director, 
and the division's seal, or facsimiles of them; 
(b) file the signed original in its office; and 
(c) return the stamped copy to the person who filed it or 
as directed by the person who filed it. 
(2) Upon the filing with the division of a certificate of 
amendment, the articles of organization shall be amended as 
set forth in the certificate of amendment, and upon the 
effective date of a certificate of dissolution or of a judicial 
decree of cancellation, the articles of organization shall be 
canceled. 1996 
48-2b-118. Effect of filing — Prefi l ing act iv i t ies . 
(1) Upon the placement of a stamp or seal, as provided in 
Subsection 48~2b-117(l)(a), on the articles of organization, the 
limited liability company shall be considered organized. 
(2) Except as against the state of Utah in a proceeding to 
cancel or revoke the certificate of organization or in a proceed-
ing for involuntary dissolution of the limited liability company, 
the filed articles shall be conclusive evidence that all condi-
tions precedent required to be performed by the members have 
been complied with and that the limited liability company has 
been legally organized under this chapter. 
(3) A limited liability company may not transact business or 
incur indebtedness, except that which is incidental to its 
organization or to obtaining subscriptions for or payment of 
contributions, until the articles of organization have been filed 
with the division. Persons engaged in prefiling activities other 
than those authorized by this section shall be jointly and 
severally liable for any debts cr liabilities incurred in the 
course of those activities. Nevertheless, this section may a^ 
be interpreted to invalidate any debts, contracts, or liabilities 
of the limited liability company incurred on behalf of $% 
limited liability company prior to the filing of its articles of 
organization with the division.
 199l 
48-2b-119. Records . 
(1) Each limited liability company shall keep at its printf. 
pal place of business the following: 
(a) a current list in alphabetical order of the full name 
and last known business street address of each member 
(b) a copy of the stamped articles of organization and 
all certificates of amendment to them, collectively re-
ferred to as the "certificate of organization," together with 
executed copies of any powers of attorney pursuant to 
which any certificate of amendment has been executed; 
(c) copies of the limited liability company's federal, 
state, and local income tax returns and reports, if any, for 
the three most recent years; 
(d) copies of any financial statements of the limited 
liability company, if any, for the three most recent years; 
(e) a copy of the limited liability company's operating 
agreement, if any; and 
(f) unless otherwise set forth in the articles of organi-
zation, a written statement setting forth: 
(i) the amount of cash and a description and state-
ment of the agreed value of the other property oi 
services contributed and agreed to be contributed b) 
each member; 
(ii) the times at which, or events on the happening 
of which, any additional contributions agreed to tx 
made by each member are to be made; 
(iii) any right of a member to receive distribution* 
which include a return of all or any of the member*! 
contributions; and 
(iv) any event upon the happening of which th< 
limited liability company is to be dissolved and it* 
affairs wound up. 
(2) Records kept under this section are subject to inspectio: 
and copying at the reasonable request and at the expense o 
any member during ordinary business hours. The divisior 
may subpoena any of these records if a limited liability 
company denies any member access to the records. 199! 
48-2b-120. Annual report . 
(1) Each limited liability company and each foreign limitec 
liability company authorized to transact business in this 6tat* 
shall file with the division, during the month of its anniver 
sary date of formation, in the case of domestic limited liability 
companies, or during the month of the anniversary date o 
being granted authority to transact business in this state, ii 
the case of foreign limited liability companies authorized U 
transact business in this state, an annual report setting forth 
(a) the name of the limited liability company and th< 
state or country under the laws of which it is formed; 
(b) the name and street address of the agent for servia 
of process required to be maintained under Section 48-2b 
123; and 
(c) there is a change of the registered agent required U 
be maintained by Section 48-2b-123. 
(2) The annual report shall be made on forms prescribec 
and furnished by the division, and the information containet 
on the annual report shall be given as of the date of executioi 
of the report The annual report forms shall include a state 
ment notifying the limited liability company that failure to fil< 
the annual report will result in the suspension and eventua 
cancellation of its certificate of organization, in the case of i 
domestic limited liability company, or of its registration, in tru 
case of a foreign limiied liability company authorized t< 
transact business i-. th;r bt-ate 
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(3) The annual report shall be signed by any member under 
penalty of perjury. If the registered agent has changed since 
the last annual report, the annual report shall also be signed 
by the new registered agent. 
(4) If the report conforms to the requirements of this 
chapter, the division shall file the report. If the report does not 
conform, the division shall mail the report first class postage 
prepaid to the limited liability company a t the s t reet address 
set forth for its agent for sen-ice of process in the certificate of 
organization or most recent report, for any necessary correc-
tions. If a report is returned, the penalties for failure to file the 
report within the time prescribed in this section do not apply, 
as long as the report is corrected and returned to the division 
within 30 days from the date the nonconforming report was 
mailed to the limited liability company. 1991 
48-2b-121. W h e n a m e n d m e n t s r e q u i r e d . 
(1) The articles of organization of a limited liability com-
pany shall be amended when: 
(a) there is a change in the name of the limited liability 
company; 
(b) there is a change in the character of the business of 
the limited liability company specified in the articles of 
organization; 
(c) there is a false or erroneous s ta tement in the 
articles of organization; 
(d) there is a change in the time, as stated in the 
articles of organization, for the dissolution of the limited 
liability company; 
(e) there is a change in the names and street addresses 
of the managers of the limited liability company or, if the 
limited liability company is managed by its members , the 
names and street addresses of the members; 
(f) the members determine to fix a t ime, not previously 
specified in the articles of organization, for the dissolution 
of the limited liability company; or 
(g) the members desire to make a change in any other 
s ta tement in the articles of organization in order for the 
articles to accurately represent the agreement among 
them. 
(2) Each limited liability company shall file with the divi-
sion a copy of any amendment to the articles within 60 days 
after the adoption of the amendment . i9«2 
48-2b-122. Addit ional m e m b e r s . 
After the filing of a limited liability company's original 
articles of organization, additional members may be admitted 
as provided in the operating agreement or, if the operat ing 
agreement does not provide for the admission of additional 
members, with the written consent of all members , except 
that, notwithstanding any provision in the operat ing agree-
ment, no additional member may be admitted without the 
written consent of the members entitled to receive a majority 
of the profits of the company i9$i 
48-2b-123. Reg i s tered agent . 
(1) Each limited liability company shall continuously main-
tain an agent in this state for service cf process on the limited 
liability company. 
(2) This agent shall be 3n individual residing in this s tate , 
a domestic corporation, a foreign corporation authorized to do 
business in this s tate , or any member of the limited liability 
company. 
(3) Failure to maintain a registered agent in this s ta te shall 
be grounds for involuntary dissolution cf the limited liability 
company by the division under Section 48-2b-142. 
(4) The registered agent of a limited liability company may 
resign by filing an original and one copy of a signed wri t ten 
notice of resignation with the division. The division shall then 
mail a copy of the notice of resignation to the registered office 
of the limited liability company at the street address set forth 
in the limited liability company's articles of organization. The 
appointment of the registered agent ends 30 days after the 
division receives notice of the resignation. 1991 
48-2b-124. C a p i t a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s . 
The contributions to capital of a member to the limited 
liability company may consist of cash, property, services 
rendered, or a promissory note or other binding obligation to 
contribute cash or property or to perform services. 1991 
48«2b-125. M a n a g e m e n t . 
(1) The management of the limited liability company, un-
less otherwise provided in the articles of organization, shall be 
vested in its members in proportion to their interests in the 
profits of the limited liability company, as reflected in the 
operating agreement and as adjusted from time to time to 
properly reflect any additional contributions or withdrawals 
by the members. If the management of the limited liability 
company is vested in the members, any member has authority 
to bind the limited liability company, unless otherwise pro-
vided in the articles of organization. 
(2) If the articles of organization provide for the manage-
ment of the limited liability company by a manager or man-
agers, the manager or managers shall be any person elected by 
the members in the manner prescribed by and provided in the 
operating agreement of the limited liability company. If the 
management of the limited liability company is vested in a 
manager or managers, any manager has authority to bind the 
limited liability company, unless otherwise provided in the 
articles of organization. A manager shall serve for a term 
specified in the operating agreement. This t e rm may not 
exceed the duration of the limited liability company as speci-
fied in the articles of organization. 
(3) The manager or managers shall also hold the offices and 
have the responsibilities accorded to them by the members 
and as provided for in the operating agreement of the limited 
liability company. 1992 
48-2b-126. O p e r a t i n g a g r e e m e n t s . 
(1) An operating agreement may be adopted with the 
unanimous consent of the members. 
(2) An operating agreement may be altered, amended, or 
repealed as provided in the operating agreement of the limited 
liability company. 
(3) The operating agreements may provide for the regula-
tion and management of the affairs of the limited liability 
company in any manner not inconsistent with law or the 
articles of organization. 
(4) The operating agreement may also provide for the 
removal of a manager or managers and for the termination of 
a member's interest in the limited liability company. If a 
member's interest in the limited liability company is termi-
nated pursuan t to the operating agreement, the member may 
rightfully demand a return of the member's contribution 
pursuant to Section 48-2b-132. 1992 
48*2b-127. Ownership and dispos i t ion of property. 
(1) Real or personal property owned or purchased by a 
limited liability company may be held and owned, and convey-
ance shall be made, in the name of the limited liability 
company. 
(2) Ins t ruments and documents providing for the acquisi-
tion, mortgage, or disposition of property of the limited liabil-
ity company shall be valid and binding upon the limited 
liability company if they are executed by one or more manag-
ers of a limited liability company having a manager or 
managers or if they are executed by one or more members of a 
limited liability company in which management has been 
retained by the members. \99i 
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48-2b-128. Conditions for property distribution. 
From time to time, the limited liability company may 
distribute its property to the members of the limited liability 
company upon the basis stipulated in the operating agreement 
if, after distribution is made, the fair value of the assets of the 
limited liability company is in excess of all liabilities of the 
limited liability company except liabilities to members on 
account of their contributions. i»8i 
48-2b-129. Assets distribution. 
Distributions of cash or other assets of a limited liability 
company shall be allocated among the members in the manner 
provided in the operating agreement. If the operating agree-
ment does not otherwise provide, cash or other assets shall be 
allocated on the basis of value of the contributions made by 
each member to the extent they have been received by the 
limited liability company and have not been returned. Value of 
the contributions made shall be determined as stated in the 
artides of organization or the records of the limited liability 
company as required by Section 48-2b-119. 1991 
48-2b-130. Profits and losses. 
The profits and losses of a limited liability company shall be 
allocated among the members in the manner provided in the 
operating agreement. If the operating agreement does not 
otherwise provide, profits and losses shall be allocated on the 
basis of value of the contributions made by each member to the 
extent they have been received by the limited liability com-
pany and have not been returned. Value of the contributions 
made shall be determined as stated in the articles of organi-
zation or the records of the limited liability company as 
required by Section 48-2b-119. 1991 
48-2b-131. Transfer, adjustment, and assignment of 
member interests — Effect. 
(1) An interest of a member in a limited liability company 
may be adjusted, transferred, or assigned as provided in the 
operating agreement. However, if the nontransferring mem-
bers entitled to receive a majority of the non transferred profits 
of the limited liability company, pursuant to Section 48-2b-
130, do not consent to the proposed transfer or assignment, 
the transferee of the interest of the member has no right to 
participate in the management of the business and affairs of 
the limited liability company or to become a member. In that 
event, the transferee is entitled to receive only the share of 
profits or other compensation by way of income and the return 
of contributions to which that member would otherwise be 
entitled. 
(2) A member of a limited liability company organized to 
render professional services may voluntarily transfer his 
shares in a limited liability company only to a person who is 
licensed or registered by the jurisdiction in which the person 
resides to render the same type of professional services as 
those for which the company was organized. Any transfer of a 
member's interest in a limited liability company in violation of 
this section is void. 1991 
48-2b-132. Conditions for distribution of property — 
Return of contribution. 
(1) A member shall receive no distribution of limited liabil-
ity company property on account of any member's contribution 
tc capital until: 
(a) all liabilities of the limited liability company, except 
liabilities to members on account of their contributions to 
capital, have been paid or sufficient property of the 
company remains to pay them; and 
(b) the consent of all members is obtained, unless the 
return of the contribution to capital may be rightfully 
demanded as provided in this chapter, the articles of 
organization, or the operating agreement. 
(2) Subject to Subsection (1), a member may rightfujh 
demand the return of the member's contribution: j 
(a) upon the dissolution of the limited liability coi^  
pany; 1 
(b) when the date an event specified in the articles rf 
organization for the return of the contribution has ai 
rived; or | 
(c) after the member has given all other members of ti* 
limited liability company six months' prior notice j[ 
writing, if no other time period is specified in the articles' 
of organization for the dissolution of the limited liability 
company. 
(3) In the absence of a statement in the articles of organil 
zation to the contrary or the consent of all members of the 
limited liability company, a member, irrespective of the naturt 
of the member's contribution, has only the right to demanc! 
and receive cash in return for the member's contribution tcj 
capital. 1991! 
48-2b-133. Member liabilities. j 
(1) A member of a limited liability company is liable to the! 
company: 
(a) for the difference between the amount of the mem-l 
ber's contributions to capital which have been actuall)| 
made and the amount which is stated in the operating! 
agreement or other contract as having been made; and I 
(b) for any unpaid contribution to capital which thej 
member, in the operating agreement or other contract, 
agreed to make in the future at the time and on the 
conditions stated in the operating agreement or other 
contract. ! 
(2) A member holds as trustee for the limited liability ] 
company: 
(a) specific property which is stated in the operating 
agreement or other contract as having been contributed 
by the member, if the property was not contributed or it 
has been wrongfully or erroneously returned; and 
(b) money or other property wrongfully paid or con-
veyed to the member on account of the member's contri-
bution. 
(3) The liabilities of a member as set out in this section may 
be waived or compromised upon the consent of all other 
members. This waiver or compromise does not affect the rights 
of a creditor of the limited liability company who extended 
credit or whose claim arose prior to the dissolution of the 
limited liability company. 
(4) When a member has rightfully received the return, in 
whole or in part, of his or her capital contribution, the member 
remains liable to the limited liability company for any sum, 
not in excess of the return with interest, necessary to dis-
charge the limited liability company's obligations to all credi-
tors of the limited liability company who extended credit or 
whose claims arose before the return. i^1 
48-2b-134. Execution of documents. 
(1) Unless otherwise specified in this chapter, each certifi-
cate or report required by this chapter to be filed with the 
division shall be executed in the following manner: 
(a) articles of organization shall be signed by two 
members or two managers; 
(b) the certificate of amendment shall be signed under 
penalty of perjury by at least one member, as authorized 
pursuant to the operating agreement, and by each other 
member designated in the certificate of amendment as a 
new member; 
(c) the annual repon shall be signed under penalty of 
perjury by at least one member, as authorized pursuant to 
the oper^tinp agreement, and, if the registered agent Uss 
changed subsequent to the filing of the articles of crgani-
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zation or the last annual report, by the registered agent; 
and 
(d) articles of dissolution shall be signed under penalty 
of perjury by at least one member, as authorized pursuant 
to the operating agreement. 
(2) Any person may sign any certificate or articles by an 
attorney-in-fact, but a power of attorney to sign a certificate 
relating to the admission of a member shall specify the 
admission of the member. Powers of attorney relating to the 
signing of a certificate by an attorney-in-fact need not be filed 
with the division but shall be retained by the company. 
(3) The execution of articles of organization or dissolution 
or of a certificate of amendment by a member constitutes an 
oath or affirmation, under the penalties of perjury, that the 
facts stated in the articles or certificate are true and that any 
power of attorney used in connection with the execution of the 
articles or certificate is proper in form and substance. 1992 
48-2b-135. Pena l ty for false execut ion . 
Each member or manager of a limited liability company who 
signs an}' articles, certificate, statement, report, application, 
or other document filed with the division that is known to that 
member or manager to be false in any material respect is 
guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 1991 
48-2b-136. Res ta ted art ic les of organizat ion . 
(1) A limited liability company may integrate into a single 
instrument all of the provisions of its articles of organization 
and amendments to them, and it may at the same time also 
further amend its articles of organization by adopting restated 
articles of organization. 
(2) If the restated articles of organization merely restate 
and integrate but do not further amend the initial articles of 
organization, as previously amended or supplemented by any 
certificate or instrument that was executed and filed pursuant 
to this chapter, they shall be specifically designated in their 
heading as "Restated Articles of Organization", together with 
other words that the company considers appropriate, and 
shall be executed and filed with the division. 
(3) If the restated articles restate and integrate and also 
further amend in any respect the articles of organization, as 
previously amended or supplemented, they shall be specifi-
cally designated in their heading as "Amended and Restated 
Articles of Organization", together with other words that the 
company considers appropriate, and 6hall be executed and 
filed with the division. 
(4) (a) Restated articles of organization shall state, either 
in their heading or in an introductory paragraph, the 
company's present name, and, if it has been changed, the 
name under which it was originally filed and the date of 
filing of its original articles of organization with the 
division. Restated articles shall also state that they were 
duly executed and filed in accordance with this section. 
(b) If the restated articles only restate and integrate 
and do not further amend the provisions of the articles of 
organization as previously amended or supplemented and 
there is no discrepancy between those provisions and the 
provisions of the restated articles, they shall so state. 
(5) Upon the filing of the restated articles of organization 
with the division, the initial articles, as previously amended or 
supplemented, shall be superseded. Thereafter, the restated 
articles of organization, including any further amendment cr 
changes made by the restated articles, shall be the articles of 
organization, but the original effective date of formation shall 
remain unchanged. 
(6) Any amendment or change made in connection with the 
restatement and integration of the articles of organization 
shall be subject to any other provision of this chapter, not 
inconsistent with this section, that would apply if a separate 
certificate of amendment were filed to make the amendment 
or change. issi 
48-2b-137. Dissolut ion. 
A limited liability company organized under this chapter 
sha)) be dissolved upon the occurrence of any of the following 
events: 
(1) when the period fixed for the duration of the limited 
liability company in its articles of organization or operat-
ing agreement expires; 
(2) by written agreement signed by the members en-
titled to receive a majority of the profits of the limited 
liability company, unless otherwise provided in the oper-
ating agreement; 
(3) except as provided otherwise in the operating 
agreement, upon the death, retirement, resignation, ex-
pulsion, bankruptcy, or dissolution of a member or upon 
the occurrence of any other event that terminates the 
continued eligibility for membership of a member in the 
limited liability company, unless the business of the 
limited liability company is continued by the members: 
(a) under a right to continue the business, as 
provided in the operating agreement, but only in 
accordance with the terms, conditions, and provisions 
specified in the operating agreement; or 
(b) if the right to continue is not specified in the 
operating agreement, by the consent of all remaining 
members within 90 days after the event of termina-
tion; or 
(4) when the limited liability company is not the suc-
cessor limited liability company in the merger or consoli-
dation of two or more limited liability companies. 1992 
48-2b-138. Set t lement upon dissolut ion. 
(1) In settling accounts after dissolution, the liabilities of 
the limited liability company shall be entitled to payment in 
the following order: 
(a) liabilities to creditors, in the order of priority as 
provided by law, except those liabilities to members of the 
limited liability company on account of their contribu-
tions; 
(b) except as provided in the operating agreement, 
liabilities to members of the limited liability company in 
respect of their contributions to capital; and 
(c) liabilities to members of the limited liability com-
pany in respect of their shares of the profits and other 
compensation by way of income on tbeir contributions. 
(2) Members shall share in the limited liability company-
assets as provided in the operating agreement, or if not so 
provided, in respect to their claims for capital and in respect to 
their claims for profits or for compensation by way of income 
on their contributions, respectively, in proportion to the re-
spective amounts of the claims. 1991 
48-2b-139. Articles of d isso lut ion . 
When all debts, liabilities, and obligations of the limited 
liability company have been paid or discharged, or adequate 
provision has been made to do so, and all of the remaining 
property and assets of the limited liability company have been 
distributed to the members, articles of dissolution shall be 
executed. The articles shall set forth: 
(1) the name of the limited liability company; 
(2) that all state taxes pavable, debts, obligations, and 
liabilities have been paid or discharged, or that adequate 
provision has been made to do so; 
(3) that all the remaining property and assets have 
been distributed among its members in accordance with 
their respective rights and interests; and 
(4) that there are no suits pending against the com-
pany in any court or that adequate provision has been 
made for the satisfaction of any judgment, order, or decree 
that may be entered against it in any pending suit. 1991 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 58 Am. Jur. 2d New Trial 
§§ 11 to 14, 29 et seq., 187 to 191. 
C.J.S. — 66 C.J.S. New Trial §§ 13 et seq., 
115, 116, 122 to 127. 
A.L.R. — Consent as ground of vacating 
judgment, or granting new trial, in civil case, 
after expiration of term or time prescribed by 
statute or rules of court, 3 A.L.R.3d 1191. 
Propriety and prejudicial effect of suggestion 
or comments by judge as to compromise or set-
tlement of civil case, 6 A.L.R.3d 1457. 
Necessity and propriety of counter-affidavits 
in opposition to motion for new trial in civil 
case, 7 A.L.R.3d 1000. 
Quotient verdicts, 8 A.L.R.3d 335. 
Propriety and prejudicial effect of instruc-
tions in civil case as affected by the manner in 
which they are written, 10 A.L.R.3d 501. 
Prejudicial effect of unauthorized view by 
jury in civil case of scene of accident or prem-
ises in question, 11 A.L.R.3d 918. 
Propriety and prejudicial effect of reference 
by counsel in civil case to result of former trial 
of same case, or amount of verdict therein, 15 
A.L.R.3d 1101. 
Absence of judge from courtroom during trial 
of civil case, 25 A.L.R 3d 637. 
Juror's voir dire denial or nondisclosure of 
acquaintance or relationship with attorney in 
case, or with partner or associate of such attor-
ney, as ground for new trial or mistrial, 64 
A.L.R.3d 126. 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order, 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other 
parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may 
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of 
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pen-
dency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is 
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending 
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evi-
dence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may 
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a 
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrin-
sic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; 
(4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally 
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has 
failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has 
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is 
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that 
the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3 
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A 
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or 
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to enter-
tain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or pro-
ceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for 
Amendment, after expiration of time for fil-
ing motion for new trial, in civil case, of motion 
made in due time, 69 A.L.R.3d 845. 
Authority of state court to order jury trial in 
civil case where jury has been waived or not 
demanded by parties, 9 A.L.R.4th 1041. 
Deafness of juror as ground for impeaching 
verdict, or securing new trial or reversal on 
appeal, 38 A.L.R.4th 1170. 
Jury trial waiver as binding on later state 
civil trial, 48 A.L.R.4th 747. 
Court reporter'8 death or disability prior to 
transcribing notes as grounds for reversal or 
new trial, 57 A.L.R.4th 1049. 
Propriety of limiting to issue of damages 
alone new trial granted on ground of inade-
quacy of damages — modern cases, 5 A.L.R.5th 
875. 
Excessiveness or adequacy of compensatory 
damages for personal injury to or death of sea-
man in actions under Jones Act (46 USCS 
Appx. § 688) or doctrine of unseaworthiness — 
modern cases, 96 A.LR. Fed. 541. 
Excessiveness or adequacy of awards of dam-
ages for personal injury or death in actions un-
der Federal Employers'JLiability Act (45 USCS 
§§ 51 et seq ) — modern cases, 97 A.L R. Fed. 
189. 
Key Numbers. — New Trial *=» 13 et seq., 
110, 116. 
A k u i c \J\J 
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these 
rules or by an independent action. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 60, F.R.C.P. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
"Any other reason justifying relief." 
—Default judgment. 
—Impossibility of compliance with order. 
—Incompetent counsel. 
—Lack of due process. 
—Merits of case. 
—Mistake or inadvertence. 
—Mutual mistake. 
—Real party in interest. 
—Refund of fine after dismissal. 
Appeals. 
Clerical mistakes. 
—Computation of damages. 
—Correction after appeal. 
—Date of judgment. 
Void judgment. 
—Estate record. 
—Inherent power of courts. 
—Intent of court and parties. 
—Judicial error distinguished. 
—Order prepared by counsel. 
—Predating of new trial motion. 
Court's discretion. 
Default judgment. 
Effect of set-aside judgment. 
—Admissions. 
Form of motion. 
Fraud. 
—Burden of proof. 
—Divorce action. 
Independent action. 
—Constitutionality of taxes. 
—Divorce decree. 
—Fraud or duress. 
—Motion distinguished. 
Invalid summons. 
—Amendment without notice. 
Inequity of prospective application. 
Jurisdiction. 
Mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable 
neglect. 
—Default judgment. 
Illness. 
Inconvenience. 
Meritorious. 
Merits of claim. 
Negligence of attorney. 
No claim for relief. 
—Delayed motion for new trial. 
—Factual error. 
—Failure to file cost bill. 
—Failure to file notice of appeal. 
—Nonreceipt of notice and findings. 
—Trial court's discretion. 
—Unemployment compensation appeal. 
—Workmen's compensation appeal. 
Newly discovered evidence. 
—Burden of proof. 
—Discretion not abused. 
Procedure. 
—Notice to parties. 
Res judicata. 
Reversal of judgment. 
—Invalidation of sale. 
Satisfaction, release or discharge. 
—Accord and satisfaction. 
—Discharging representative of estate from 
further demand. 
—Erroneously included damages. 
—Prospective application of judgment. 
Timeliness of motion. 
—Confused mental condition of party. 
—Dismissal for lack of prosecution. 
—Fraud. 
—Invalid service. 
—Judicial error. 
—Jurisdiction. 
—Mistake, inadvertence and neglect. 
—Newly discovered evidence. 
—Order entered upon erroneous assumption. 
—"Reasonable time." 
—Reconsideration of previously denied motion. 
—Satisfaction. 
Unauthorized appearance. 
Void judgment. 
—Basis. 
—Lack of jurisdiction. 
Cited. 
"Any other reason justifying relief." 
Subdivision (7) embodies three require-
ments: First, that the reason be one other than 
those listed in Subdivisions (1) through (6); sec-
ond, that the reason justify relief; and third, 
that the motion be made within a reasonable 
time. Laub v. South Cent. Utah Tel. Ass'n, 657 
P.2d 1304 (Utah 1982); Richins v. Delbert 
Chipman & Sons, 817 P.2d 382 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). 
Where a defendant's motion to set aside 
judgment based on Subdivisions (b)(1) and (7) 
and his motion for a new trial claimed that 
plaintiff violated Rule 5(a) on several occasions 
by not providing defendant with a copy of 
pleadings, thereby causing surprise, centering 
on plaintiffs failure to provide a copy of his 
motion for summary judgment to defendant, 
which the latter claimed was a clear showing 
of fraud on plaintiffs part, the trial court could 
have believed in denying defendant's motion, 
that fraud was not present in what could be 
considered a lapse in procedure by plaintiffs 
counsel. Walker v. Carlson, 740 P.2d 1372 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Defendant's claim that he mistakenly en-
tered into an ill-advised stipulation without 
fully understanding its consequences was cor-
rectly characterized by trial court as mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise or neglect under Subdi-
vision (b)(1); because Subdivision (b)(1) ap-
plied, Subdivision (b)(7) could not apply and 
could not be used to circumvent the three-
month filing period. Richins v. Delbert 
Chipman & Sons, 817 P.2d 382 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). 
555 UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE Rule 301 
ordinarily, neither assignment nor garnish-
ment of wages imputes any wrong or miscon-
duct of any kind to debtor. Rugg v. Tolman, 39 
Utah 295, 117 P. 54 (1911). 
—Waters and water rights. 
It was a matter of common knowledge that 
on various streams of Utah there were hun-
dreds of farmers and others using water there-
from, many of them with rights recognized 
without question for more than half a century. 
Brady v. McGonagle, 57 Utah 424, 195 P. 188 
(1921). 
It was a matter of common knowledge in this 
state that many controversies between claim-
ants and much litigation resulted prior to 1903 
respecting the dates of appropriation by differ-
ent claimants of the waters of the state. 
Utah Law Review. — Utah Rules of Evi-
dence 1983, 1985 Utah L. Rev. 63, 74. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and 
Error §§ 739 to 743; 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence 
§§ 14 to 122; 75A Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 1212. 
C.J.S. — 4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 572; 
22A C.J.S. Criminal Law §§ 657 to 681; 31 
Advisory Committee Note. — The text of 
this rule is adapted from Rule 301, Wyoming 
Rules of Evidence (1977), which is Rule 301, 
Uniform Rules of Evidence (1974) except that 
the word "civil" is added in subdivision (a). 
Rule 301, Federal Rules of Evidence, is a sub-
stantially different rule than that promulgated 
by the United States Supreme Court. Rule 301, 
as originally proposed by the United States Su-
preme Court, placed the burden upon the op-
posing party of establishing the non-existence 
of a presumed fact once the party invoking the 
presumption had established sufficient facts to 
give rise to the presumption, but Rule 3C1 as 
promulgated by Congress adopted a substan-
tially different rule limiting the effect of pre-
sumption, not otherwise controlled by statute, 
to one of going forward with proof rather than 
casting the burden of proof upon the opposing 
party. 
Rule 14, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) pro-
vided that except for presumptions which are 
conclusive or irrefutable, once the basic fact 
supporting the presumption is established "the 
presumption continues to exist and the burden 
of establishing the non-existence of the pre-
sumed fact is upon the party against whom the 
Deseret Live Stock Co. v. Hooppiania, 66 Utah 
25, 239 P. 479, 31 A.L.R. 900 (1925). 
It is common knowledge that Great Salt 
Lake is navigable, wholly within the bound-
aries of this state, is 22 percent salt, and is 
eighty miles long and from twenty to forty 
miles wide. Robinson v. Thomas, 75 Utah 446, 
286 P. 625 (1930). 
Cited in Lamberth v. Lamberth, 550 P.2d 
200 (Utah 1976); Fitzgerald v. Critchfield, 744 
P.2d 301 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Bear River 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wright, 770 P.2d 1019 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989); Bullock v. Utah Dep't of Social 
Servs., 781 P.2d 465 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); 
State v. Sawyers, 819 P.2d 806 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). 
C.J.S. Evidence §§ 6 to 58; 31A C.J.S. Evi-
dence §§ 59 to 102; 88 C.J.S. Trial § 279. 
A.L.R. — Judicial notice as to assessed valu-
ations, 42 A.L.R.3d 1439. 
Key Numbers. — Appeal and Error «=» 714; 
Criminal Law ** 304 to 304(21); Evidence «=* 1 
to 52; Trial «=• 191, 192. 
presumption operates . . . ," To the same ef-
fect, see Koesling v. Basamakis, 539 P.2d 1043 
(Utah 1975). If evidence to rebut a presump-
tion has not been admitted, the presumption 
will determine outcome on the issue; if such 
evidence has been admitted, the presumption 
will dictate the instruction to be given the jury 
on how they are to resolve doubt. There will 
continue to be fact combinations which satisfy 
the burden of going forward with the evidence 
but which are not "presumptions" within the 
meaning of this rule and which therefore do 
not shift the burden of persuasion. They might 
best be called "permissible inferences." 
The Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) did not 
prohibit the application of presumptions in 
criminal cases. Presumptions in criminal cases 
are not treated in this rule. See Utah Code An-
notated, Section 76-1-503 (1953) or any subse-
quent revision of that section. Recent decisions 
of the United States Supreme Court in 
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) and 
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) 
have given a constitutional dimension to pre-
sumptions in criminal cases. 
Subdivision (b) is comparable in substance to 
Rule 15, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). Utah 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
ARTICLE III. 
PRESUMPTIONS. 
Rule 301. Presumptions in general in civil actions and 
proceedings. 
(a) Effect, In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by 
statute or by these rules, a presumption imposes on the party against whom it 
is directed the burden of proving that the nonexistence of the presumed fact is 
more probable than its existence. 
(b) Inconsistent presumptions. If presumptions are inconsistent, the pre-
sumption applies that is founded upon weightier considerations of policy. If 
considerations of policy are of equal weight neither presumption applies. 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALY8I8 
Photocopies. 
—Specific cases. 
Photocopies. 
—Specific cases. 
Where photostatic copies of automobile title 
were introduced and oral testimony given that 
they were true and exact reproductions of the 
originals, photostatic copies were properly ad-
mitted into evidence to prove title to automo-
bile. State v. Tuggle, 28 Utah 2d 284, 501 P.2d 
636 (1972). 
A photocopy of a composite drawing identify-
ing the defendant in a robbery case was admis-
sible in evidence after the court found that the 
destruction of the original was not done with 
fraudulent intent and no prejudice to the de-
fendant's substantive rights resulted. State v. 
Wilson, 608 P.2d 1237 (Utah 1980). 
Photocopies of defendant's palm prints were 
sufficiently authenticated and reliable and, 
therefore, properly admitted into evidence, 
where the photocopied palm prints were identi-
fied by a jailer as the only palm prints he had 
ever taken. State v. Casias, 772 P.2d 975 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence 
§§ 490, 788; 30 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence §§ 1012, 
1015. 
709, 714; C.J.S. — 32 C.J.S. Evidence 
32A C.J.S. Evidence § 815. 
Key Numbers. — Evidence *=• 174,175,359. 
Rule 1004. Admissibility of other evidence of contents. 
The original is not required, and other evidence of the contents of a writing, 
recording, or photograph is admissible if: 
(1) Originals lost or destroyed. All originals are lost or have been 
destroyed, unless the proponent lost or destroyed them in bad faith; or 
(2) Original not obtainable. No original can be obtained by any avail-
able judicial process or procedure; or 
(3) Original in possession of opponent. At a time when an original 
was under the control of the party against whom offered, that party was 
put on notice, by the pleadings or otherwise, that the content would be a 
subject of proof at the hearing, and that party does not produce the origi-
nal at the hearing; or 
(4) Collateral matters. The writing, recording, or photograph is not 
closely related to a controlling issue. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is 
the federal rule, verbatim, and embodies in a 
more comprehensive fashion the provisions of 
Rule 70, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-
ment, effective October 1, 1992, revised this 
rule to make the language gender-neutral. 
Cros8-References. — Original consisting of 
numerous accounts, parol evidence of contents, 
§ 78-25-16(5). 
Proof of instruments affecting real estate, 
§ 78-25-13. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Original in possession of opponent. 
Cited. 
Original in possession of opponent 
Within best evidence rule, telegram deliv-
ered by telegraph company to receiver was 
original. Thus where receiver failed, upon de-
mand, to produce original message received 
from telegraph company, admission of carbon 
copy from files of sender was not prejudicial 
error. B.T. Moran, Inc. v. First Sec. Corp., 82 
Utah 316, 24 P.2d 384 (1933). 
Cited in Meyer v. General Am. Corp., 569 
P.2d 1094 (Utah 1977). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence 
§ 448 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 32A C.J.S. Evidence § 776 et seq. 
A.L.R. — Admissibility in evidence of sound 
recording as affected by hearsay and best evi-
dence rules, 58 A.L.R.3d 598. 
Admissibility of computerized private busi-
ness records, 7 A.L.R.4th 8. 
Federal Rules of Evidence: admissibility, 
pursuant to Rule 1004(1) of other evidence of 
contents of writing, recording, or photograph, 
where originals were allegedly lost or de-
stroyed, 83 A.L.R. Fed. 554. 
Key Numbers. — Evidence •=• 157 et seq. 
S / • ' * ..A 
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. , . i , , ARTICLES OF ORGANIZATION OF SURE-TECH LLC 
^4€Jla(Lj:|(|, ^  ?7 
Gary R. Hansen 
OlvWon Director A R T I C T . K I 
(Name) 
The name of this Limited Liability Company shall be 
Sure-Tech LLC. 
ARTICLE II 
(Term) 
The term of this Limited Liability Company shall be perpetual 
or until terminated by agreement of its members and managers, 
ARTICLE III 
(Business Purpose) 
Sure-Tech LLC is organized for the purpose of investing in 
various companies and projects, however, the LLC may engage in any 
activity permitted under Utah law or the laws of the states and/or 
territories of the United States wherein Sure-Tech LLC is 
authorized to do business, 
ARTICLE IV ^ ;'•-' 
(Registered Agent) :*; ' / • 
The Registered Agent for Sure-Tech LLC is Charles A. Schultz'l 
who, by affixing his signature hereto, hereby acknowledged-" his , 
CO ' ' J 
willingness to act as the Registered Agent on behalf of SurerTech-
LLC. 
Registered Agent: 
Charles A. Schultz 
345 East 400' Sc>uth, Suite 101 
Salt Lake City) Utah 84111 
EXHIBIT # _ L 
Dated this / S day of January', 1993. 
Charles A. Schultz (Registered Agent) 
Additionally, Sure-Tech LLC hereby appoints the Department of 
Corporations as its Registered Agent for service of process, if the 
Registered Agent named herein has resigned, the agent's authority 
has been revoked or if the Agent cannot be found or served after 
due diligence. 
ARTICLE V 
(Principal Place of Business) 
The principal place of Business for Sure-Tech LLC shall be 345 
East 400 South, Suite 101, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
ARTICLE VI 
(Managers of Sure-Tech LLC) 
The Managers of Sure-Tsch LLC are: 
Robert J. Pett 
224 West 7th South 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
Charles A. Schultz 
345 South East 400, Suite 101 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
the above named individuals shall act as the managers of Sure-Tech 
LLC until the first meeting of the members of Sure-Tech LLC or 
2 
until their successors are elected« 
Dated this of January, 1993. 
Charles A. Schultz 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
On the /y day of January 1993, the above signed Robert J, 
TPetrC and Charles A. Schultz personally appeared before roe and die 
personally sign the foregoing Articles of Organization in my 
presence. 
Dated this / y day of January 1993. 
Notary Public ' CO No' 
Notary PubBo • JSEssr J 
Stateo7utah I 
.J 
3 
OPERATING AGREEMENT OF 
SURE-TECH, LLC. 
THIS OPERATING AGREEMENT of Sure-Tech, LLC.. (hereinafter, 
sometimes termed "the LLC"), is executed this //^^day of 
January, 1993, between Robert J. Pett and Charles A. Schultz, 
(hereinafter, referred to as "the Managers"), and Robert J. Pett 
and Charles A. Schultz as "Members"). 
ARTICLE I 
[Formation and Principal Place of Business] 
Section 1.1: Formation. The Members hereby form a limited 
Liability Company pursuant to the provisions of Section 48-2b-101 
through 48-2b-156 of the Utah Limited Liability Company Act, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. Unless set forth otherwise in 
this Operating Agreement, the provisions of Chapter 2, Title 48, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, shall govern the rights and liabilities 
of the parties to this Agreement. If there is a conflict between 
provisions of this Agreement and the Utah Limited Liability 
Company Act, the provisions of this Agreement shall control 
except that if the conflict is with respect to a provision that 
would cause the Liability Company to be taxed as an association 
for federal income tax purposes, then the provisions of the said 
Utah Limited Liability Company Act shall control. The parties 
intend that the Liability company shall be taxed as a 
partnership. The Managers or Members shall execute and cause to 
be filed Articles of Organization, as required by Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 48-2b-116, and,- if'applicable, an application 
for an assumed name with the Secretary of State for the State of 
Utah. 
Section 1.2: Name. The Limited Liability Company shall 
operate under the name of Sure-Tech, LLC. 
Section 1.3: Principal Place of Business. The principal 
place of business and the location where Limited Liability 
Company records are to be maintained shall be at 345 East 400 
South, Suite 101, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. The business of 
the Limited Liability Company may also be conducted at such other 
or additional place or places as may be designated by the 
Managers and Members. 
Section 1.4: The Members. The names and places of 
residence of each Member of the Limited Liability Company are as 
follows: 
.Robert J. Pett Charles A. Schultz 
224 West 7th South 640 South 2nd West 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 Brigham City, Utah 84302 
EXHIBIT # & 
SECTION 1.4-1: The Managers. The names and places of 
residence of each Managers of the Limited Liability Company are 
as follows: 
Robert J. Pett Charles A, Schultz 
224 West 7th South 640 South 2nd West 
Brigham City, Utah 843 02 Brigham City, Utah 84 3 02 
Section 1.5: Registered Agent. The name of the Limited 
Liability Company's Registered Agent and the address of its 
initial registered office is: 
Registered Agent: 
Charles A. Schultz 
345 East 400 South, Suite 101 
SLC, UT 84111 
ARTICLE II 
[Purposes of the Limited Liability Company] 
The LLC is formed for the purpose of investing in various 
companies and projects, however, Sure-Tech, LLC, may engage in 
any activity permitted under Utah law or the laws of the states 
and/or territories of the United States wherein Sure-Tech, LLC, 
is authorized to do business. 
ARTICLE III 
[Term of the Limited Liability Company] 
The LLC shall commence as of January 13, 1993 and shall 
continue for an indefinite period of time or until terminated by 
action of the Members or as hereinafter provided by this 
Agreement, unless terminated by law by the operation of law at an 
earlier date. 
ARTICLE IV 
[Accounting for the Limited Liability Company] 
Section 4.1: Method of Accounting. The LLC shall keep its 
accounting records and shall report for income tax purposes on 
the cash basis. The records shall be maintained in accordance 
with generally accepted accounting principles. 
Section 4.2: Annual Statements. The Managers shall cause 
financial statements to be prepared not less than annually, 
provide any income is produced, and copies of the statement shall 
be delivered to each Member. Copies of all income tax returns 
filed by the LLC also shall be furnished to all Members. 
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Section 4.3: Access to Accounting Records. Any Member 
shall have reasonable access to the accounting records of the LLC 
during regular business hours of the LLC. 
Section 4.4: Income Tax Information. The Managers shall 
provide to each Member information of the LLCfs taxable income or 
loss and each class of income, gain, or deduction that is 
relevant to reporting the LLC's income. The information shall 
also show each Members1 distributive share of each class of 
income, gain, loss, or deduction. This information shall be 
furnished to the Members as sooft as possible after the close of 
the LLC's taxable year. 
Section 4.5: Interim Financial Statement. On written 
request, any Member shall be entitled to copies of any interim 
financial statements prepared for the Managers. 
Section 4.6: Articles of Organization. The Managers shall 
not be required to mail a cop^ of the Articles of Organization to 
each Member. Provided, however, upon written request therefor, 
the Managers shall mail a copy of the Articles of Organization to 
the requesting Member, the costs thereof to be born by such 
requesting Member. 
Section 4.7: Cost of Inspection of Records — Right to 
Information. Each Member has the right to records of the LLC. 
The cost of providing such information shall be the sole 
responsibility of the Member who requests the same unless a 
Manager in its sole and absolute discretion determines that the 
LLC should bear such costs. 
ARTICLE V 
[Capital Contributions] 
Section 5.1: Initial Capital Contribution. The initial 
capital contributions to the LLC shall all be made in cash. The 
cash contributed by each Member and the percentage of said 
capital contributions contributed by each Member is as follows: 
Members: VALUE PERCENTAGE 
Robert Pett $10.00 1% 
Charles A. Schultz $990.00 99% 
Section 5.2: Respective Interests of Members in the Initial 
Capital Contribution. The interests of the Members in the 
capital originally contributed shall be those same percentages as 
are set forth in Section 5.1. 
Section 5.3: Additional Capital Contributions. Additional 
capital contributions to the capital of the LLC beyond those 
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12.2-1: Transfer of Interest upon Death. Nothing contained 
in this Agreement, however, shall prevent the interest of 
any Member from being transferred or disposed of by will or 
by intestacy to or for the benefit of the Members1 immediate 
family; provided, however, that transfers by way of 
testamentary or inter vivofs trusts must have trustees who 
are members of the Members1 immediate family; immediate 
family is defined as parents, spouse, or issue of the Member 
or the Members1 spouse. With regard to such transfer, any 
legal representative or heir shall become a Member in law 
and fact after the costs referred to in Section 12•2-3: have 
been paid. 
12.3: Additional Members. No new Members may be added 
without the unanimous written consent of the present Members. 
New Members may only be added by written consent of the present 
Members and upon such terms' and conditions as specified by the 
present Members. 
ARTICLE XIII 
[Voluntary Dissolution] 
Section 13.1: Winding Uft the LLC. On any voluntary 
dissolution, the LLC shall immediately commence to wind up its 
affairs. The Members shall continue to share profits and losses 
during the period of liquidation in the same proportions as 
before dissolution. The proceeds from liquidation of LLC assets 
shall be applied as follows: 
13.1-1: Payment to creditors of the LLC, other than 
Members, in the order of priority provided by law. 
13.1-2: Payment to Managers and Members for unpaid salaries 
and for the credit balances in their drawing accounts. 
-13.1-3: Payment to the Members of the credit balances in 
- their capital accounts. 
Section 13.2: Gains or Losses in Process of Liquidation. 
Any gain or loss on disposition of LLC properties in liquidation 
shall be credited or charged to the Members in the proportions of 
their interest in profits or losses as specified in Section 7.1. 
Any property distributed in kind in liquidation shall be valued 
and treated as though the property were sold and the cash 
proceeds were distributed. The difference between the value of 
property distributed in kind and its book value shall be treated 
as a gain or loss on sale of the property and shall be credited 
or charged to the Members in the proportions of their interests 
in profits or losses as specified in Section 7.1. 
Section 13.3: Balance Owed by a Member. Should any Member 
have a debit balance in his capital account, whether by reason of 
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losses in liquidating LLC assets or otherwise, the debit balance 
shall represent an obligation from him to the other Members, to 
be paid in cash within thirty (3 0) days after written demand by 
the other Members. 
ARTICLE XIV 
[Expulsion of a Member] 
A Member or Manager may be expelled from the LLC at any time 
upon an affirmative vote of One Hundred percent (100%) of the 
Members of the LLC, other than the Member whose expulsion is 
proposed. The expulsion shall be effective immediately upon 
delivery to the expelled Member of written notice of his 
expulsion. The remaining Members shall continue the LLC under 
its present name, and they shall pay to the expelled Members the 
value of his interest in the LLC pursuant to Article 10.2. 
ARTICLE XV 
[Amendments] 
This Limited Liability Company Operating Agreement may only 
be amended by a written agreement executed by all Managers and 
the Members. 
ARTICLE XVI 
[Miscellaneous Provisions] 
16.1: Waiver. The waiver by any party to this Agreement, 
of any of the terms, covenants or conditions of this Agreement, 
shall not he deemed a waiver of such party's right to enforce 
that term, covenant or condition at a subsequent date or on a 
subsequent occasion. Nor shall any waiver be construed to 
prohibit any of the parties to this Agreement from enforcing any 
of the oth^r terms, covenants or conditions of this Agreement. 
Any alleged waiver of any of the terms, covenants and conditions, 
of this Agreement, or breaches thereof, shall not b^ enforceable 
unless such waiver is in writing specifically setting forth which 
term, covenant, condition or other action or inaction is being 
waived. 
16.2: Third Party Beneficiaries. Subject to the provisions 
of Article 12.2-1: of this Agreement, no provision of this 
Agreement nor any document incorporated herein, is intended to 
confer, and shall not be construed to confer, any rights on any 
person or entity that is not a party to this Agreement. 
16.3: Captions and Definitions. The Captions used in this 
Agreement are for convenience only and shall not be deemed to be 
relevant in resolving any question of the interpretation or 
construction of part of this Agreement. 
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16.4: Invalidity of Provisions. If, for any reason 
whatsoever, any of the provisions contained in this Agreement are 
determined to be unlawful or unenforceable it is the express 
intent of the Members that the remainder of the Agreement shall 
remain in full force and effect. 
16.5: Jurisdiction, Venue and Applicable Law. This 
Agreement shall be governed by, and construed in accordance with, 
the laws of the State of Utah. Any action to enforce any of the 
provisions of this Agreement sh^ll be filed in the Third District 
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, which Court shall apply 
Utah law. The parties to this Agreement hereby voluntarily 
consent to venue and jurisdiction in the referenced court. 
16.6: Attorney's Fees. Should any party to this Agreement 
be required to employ an attorney to enforce any of the terms, 
covenants or conditions of this Agreement, to collect any damages 
or to enforce or enjoin any action, the prevailing party shall be 
entitled to recover reasonable its costs and reasonable 
attorneyfs fees. 
16.7: Notices. All notice required or permitted to be sent 
to Sure-Tech, LLC, under the provisions of this Agreement shall 
be sent by Certified Mail, addressed to Sure-Tech, LLC., 345 East 
400 South, Suite 101, Salt Lake City 84111. Such notices shall 
be effective upon receipt and acknowledgment of receipt by Sure-
Tech , LLC. 
16.8: Entirety of Agreement. This Agreement constitutes 
the entirety of the Agreement among the parties hereto. This 
Agreement and any of its terms, covenants, conditions, or other 
provisions may only be altered, amended, modified, or revoked in 
writing as provided in this Agreement. It is expressly agreed 
and understood that all prior or contemporaneous negotiations, 
representations or agreements are merged in this Agreement, and 
that no oral representations, promises or negotiations, of any 
nature whatsoever, shall survive the execution of this Agreement. 
IN WITNESS HEREOF, the parties have signed this Limited 
Liability Company Operating Agreement the day and year first 
above written. 
Managers: 
Each Manager, signatory hereto, hereby acknowledges that he 
is signing under penalty of perjury, 
Robert J. Sett 
• ^ \ 
Charles A. Schultz 
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Members: 
Each Member, signatory hereto, hereby acknowledges that he 
is signing under penalty of perjury, 
Robert J. Pjext Charles A. Schultz 
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INITIAL.MEETING OF 
SURE-TECH, LLC. 
The initial meeting of the members of Sure-Tech, LLC, was 
held January 16, 1993, at 345 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah. Robert J. Pett and Charles Schultz, the only members of 
the LLC, were present. It was agreed that Charles A. Schultz 
would act as the primary manager of Sure-Tech, although Robert 
Pett would also serve as a manager. It was further agreed that 
the Operating Agreement for Sure-Tech would be ratified and 
signed. 
Dated this /{r* day of January 1993. 
Robert J. Pdtt 
Charles A. Schultz T ^ " 
EXHIBIT # J £ 
FIRST ANNUAL MEETING OF 
SURE-TECH, LLC. 
The first annual meeting of the members of Sure-Tech, LLC, 
was held January 26, 1994, at 640 South 2nd, West Brigham City. 
Robert J. Pett and Charles Schultz, the only members of the LLC, 
were present. Because Sure-Tech and not made any money in the 
previous year, it was agreed that no annual report was necessary. 
Likewise because no money had been made in the prior year, it was 
agreed that no tax return need be filed. It was also agreed that 
there would be no changes in management or operation of the LLC. 
Dated this Q_(j> day of January 1994. 
c XHiBIT #. 5 
SECOND ANNUAL MEETING OF 
SURE-TECH, LLC. 
The SECOND ANNUAL MEETING of the members of Sure-Tech, LLC, was 
held February 19, 1995, at 224 West 7th South, Brigham City. Robert J. Pett and 
Charles Schultz, the only members of the LLC, were present. Once again, because Sure-
Tech and not made any money in the previous year, it was agreed that no Annual 
Report was would be prepared, and for the present time no tax return would be filed for 
1994. It was also agreed that there would be no changes in management or operation of 
the LLC, and that Sure-Tech would continue its litigation against EML, et. al. 
RobertXPetTT J Schultz 
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AFFIDAVIT 
STATE OF UTAII } 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE } 
rRobert J. Pett, being first duly; sworn, state as follows: 
1. I, Robert J. Pett, have personal knowledge of the statements contained in this 
Affidavit. 
2. In late December 1992 or early January 1993, I was asked by Steven Evans to 
become a member and manager of an LLC with Charles Schultz. 
3. At that time, Mr. Evans explained to me that he could not be a member of the 
LLC because he had tax problems and he was afraid that the IRS would levy on his interest in 
the LLC if he were a member and that the levy would make the LLC ineffective. 
4. Mr. Evans also explained to me, at that time, that his father also had tax 
problems and could not be a member of the LLC for the same reason that he, Steve, could not 
be a member. 
5. Mr. Evans explained to me that the purpose of the LLC was to distribute profits 
received from a company called EML Projects to various people, including himself, who for 
various reasons could not be members of the LLC. At that time Steve also promised me that I 
would be compensated for acting as a member and manager of the LLC. 
6. I agreed to be a member and manager so long as Charles was the one mainly 
responsible for the operation of the LLC. 
EXHIBIT # C 
7. The previously referenced meeting with Mr. Evans and Mr. Schultz was held at 
Mr. Schultz's office a 345 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah; 
8. On January 14, 1993, I signed the Articles of Organization for Sure-Tech LLC. 
9. The Articles were signed at Mr. Schultz's office a 345 East 400 South, Salt Lake 
City, Utah. A copy of the Articles is attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit No. 1. 
10. The Initial Meeting of Sure-Tech was held on January 16, 1993, at Mr. Schultz's 
office a 345 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah. A copy of the Minutes of the Initial Meeting 
is attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit No. 2. 
11. At the Initial Meeting on January 16, 1993, Charles and I reviewed, adopted and 
signed an Operating Agreement for Sure-Tech. A copy of that Agreement signed by me is 
attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit No. 3. 
12. Steve Evans was not present at the Meeting because Charles and I were, and are, 
the only members and managers of Sure-Tech. 
13. Sometime in November 1993, Charles gave me a copy of the Annual Report he 
was going to file for Sure-Tech 1993, and I reviewed it. A copy of that Report is attached to 
this Affidavit as Exhibit No. 4. 
14. On January 26, 1994, Charles and I held the First Annual Meeting of Sure-Tech. 
15. The Meeting was held at Charles' home in Brigham City. 
16. Only Charles and 1 were present because we were, and are, the only members of 
Sure-Tech. 
17. At that Meeting we discussed the fact that EML had not made any money and 
that Sure-Tech had not received any money from EML; therefore, we agreed that we did not 
need to file a tax return for Sure-Tech. A copy of the Minutes of the First Annual Meeting of 
Sure-Tech is attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit No. 5. 
18. Sometime in December 1994, Charles gave me a copy of the Annual Report he 
was going to file for Sure-Tech for the 1994 year, and I reviewed it. A copy of that Report is 
attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit No. 6. 
19. On February 19, 1995, Charles and I held the Second Annual Meeting of Sure-
Tech at my home in Brigham City, Utah. 
20. At that Meeting we again discussed the fact that Sure-Tech had not received any 
money. Therefore, we again agreed that we did not need to file a tax return for Sure-Tech and 
that Sure-Tech would continue its litigation against EML. A copy of the Minutes of the Second 
Annual Meeting of Sure-Tech is attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit No. 7. 
21. I was at part of the Hearing in this matter held on May 30, 1995. 
22. Though I did not hear him testify, I am told that Steve Evans testified that some 
sort of notice of a meeting of the members of Sure-Tech was sent to me. I do not believe that 
any notice was sent, but if it was I never received any such notice. 
23. I never authorized any changes in the membership or management of Sure-Tech. 
There was never any request for a change in membership or management of Sure-Tech. 
24. I never authorized my interest in Sure-Tech to be transferred to anyone. 
25. At no time has Steve Evans, his father, his mother or anyone else other than 
Charles and me ever claimed to be members or managers of Sure-Tech. 
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26. I am aware that at the creation of Sure-Tech, Steve and Charles were working on 
some sort of agreement on how the money received from EML by Sure-Tech would be divided, 
but to the best of my knowledge, no agreement was ever reached. 
27. In any event, no money was ever generated by Sure-Tech, so how the money 
would be distributed is irrelevant, but the distribution of any money received from EML had 
nothing whatsoever to do with the ownership or management of Sure-Tech, because as Steve 
explained to me before Sure-Tech was formed, Steve and his dad could not own any interest in 
Sure-Tech. 
28. I am aware that there has been some suggestion that some of the Exhibits 
attached to this Affidavit were not prepared at the time specified on the Exhibits. I personally 
know that all of the Exhibits attached to this Affidavit were signed on the dates specified on the 
Exhibits. 
Dated this ^ T ^ d a y of June 1995. 
Subscribed and sworn to thi day of June 1995. 
v / 
y pa./ ^(__ K S, 
Motary Public ~ ~ 7 ,/ N t
>/OtU 
NOfAUV i'l.'IIIJC 
LISA A. SPJVEY 
251*4 Dt uitioin 
Salt Lako C>ly Utah 84106 
My Comm<ss»on Cxpues 
November i \UJU 
ST AT J- 1)1 l« I A l l 
AFFIDAVIT 
STATE OF UTAH } 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE} 
I, Lisa A. Spivey, being first duly sworn, state as follows: 
1. I have personal knowledge of the statements contained in this Affidavit. 
2. On November 22, 1994, I personally mailed the letter attached to this 
Affidavit as Exhibit No. 1. 
3. The Letter was sent Certified Mail to Steve Evans. 
4. The letter was only sent to Steve Evans. 
5. I was in court today, May 30, 1995, when Steve Evans testified under oath 
that he never received the November 22, 1994 letter, from Mr. Schultz. 
6 Steve Evans' statement to the Court was not true. 
7. The letter was received and signed for by Pam Evans, Steve Evans' wife, 
on November 26, 1994. A copy of the Return for Certified Mail is attached to this 
Affidavit as Exhibit No. 2. 
8. I have possession of the original Return. 
9. Attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit No. 3, is a copy of a letter from Bryan 
Fishburn, dated April 4, 1995, wherein Mr. Fishburn acknowledges the he was given a 
copy of the November 22, 1994 letter. 
EXHIBIT # S 
10. The April 4, 1995 letter, references the November 22, 1994 letter, from 
Steve Evans. 
11. If Mr. Fishburn has a copy of the November 22, 1994 letter, he receivcu u 
from someone other than from Mr. Schultz or me. No copy of the November 22, 1994 
letter, was sent to Mr. Fishburn. 
Dated this day of May 1995. 
Subscribed and sworn to this day of May 1995. 
Notaiyftlblic 
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Charles A. Schults 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
P.O. Box 526382 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84152-6382 
Telephone: (801)466-7308 
CERTIFIED MMl 
November 22, 1994 
Steve Evans 
1902 Mary Dott Way 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84in* 
Steve: 
I cannot believe you did not bother to come to the bearing today. The c t^sc against 
EML was only filed in order to secure your rights to work in the environmental field and 
particularly the right to use the waste watpr treatn*ent system you assigned to EML 
However, due to your failure to attend the bearing and tfuc also tp Lionel's failure to 
attend, I was disqualified as counsel for Surc-Tecb. 
If you do not care about protecting your interests, I sure as hell qon't. I am going to 
settle the suit against EML on the best reims for Sure-Tech. A settlement may have 
some incidental and unintentional affect on your patent claims. Therefore, I suggest that 
you obtain personal legal representation to advise you. 
Charles A. Schuitz 
CAS/lbk 
cc: file 
EXHIBIT fcL,— 
United States Postal Service 
Official Business 
PENALTY FOR PRIVATE 
USE. $300 
Print your name, address and ZIP Code here 
Cnarles A. Scha.ltz 
Attorney at Law 
P.O, Box 5263E2 
SLC, UT 94152-6382 
/ M . V . X d t l < 
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• Attach this form to the front of the mailpiece, or on the 
back if space does not permit. 
• Write "Return Receipt Requested" on the mailpiece next to 
the article number. 
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2. D Restricted Delivery 
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4a. Article Number 
P - 8 0 5 609 7S7 
4b. Service Type 
D Registered 
£D Certified 
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7. Date of Deliver 
/// 
:  y . 
D Insured 
D COD 
• Return Receipt for 
Merchandise 
5. Signage (AtfiJressee) 
6. Signature (Agent) 
8. Addressee's Address (Only if requested 
and fee is paid) 
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AFFIDAVIT 
STATE OF UTAH } 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE } 
I, Charles A. Schultz, being first duly sworn, state as follows: 
1. I have personal knowledge of the statements contained in this Affidavit. 
2. On November 22, 1994, I prepared and signed the letter attached to this 
Affidavit as Exhibit No. 1. 
3. The letter was sent Certified Mail to Steve Evans. 
4. The letter was only sent to Steve Evans. 
5. The letter was received and signed for by Pam Evans, Steve Evans' wife, 
on November 26, 1994. A copy of the Return for Certified Mail is attached to this 
Affidavit as Exhibit No. 2. 
6. The letter, referenced in paragraph No. 5 of this Affidavit, is the letter I 
testified about at the May 30, 1995 hearing before Judge Brian. 
7. I did not have the letter at the hearing because I did not know the hearing 
was going to be an evidentiary hearing. I only received the Notice of Hearing on Friday 
May 26, 1995, and the Notice did not indicate that it was an evidentiary hearing. The 
Notice of Hearing merely indicated that the Hearing was a one-half hour motion 
hearing, not an evidentiary hearing. A copy of the Notice is attached to this Affidavit as 
FXHIRITtf 0 
Exhibit No. 3. 
8. Had I known the hearing was an evidentiary hearing, I would have brought 
all of my files to the Hearing and arranged for additional witnesses to testify, but Daniels 
Request for a Hearing did not ask for an evidentiary hearing and the notice only stated 
that a 30 minute motion hearing would be held. A copy of Daniels' Request for Hearing 
is attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit No. 4. Therefore, I did not bring all of my files to 
the hearing. Furthermore, Mr. Guyon only had 20 minutes to prepare for the hearing; 
therefore, he did not have time to properly prepare and instruct me to bring additional 
documents to the Hearing. 
9. There is no doubt that Steve Evans received Exhibit No. 1, as he 
apparently gave a copy of it to Brian Fishburn. Attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit No. 
5, is a copy of a letter from Bryan Fishburn, dated April 4, 1995, wherein Mr. Fishburn 
acknowledges the he was given a copy of the November 22, 1994 letter. 
10. The April 4, 1995 letter, references the November 22, 1994 letter, from 
Steve Evans. If Mr. Fishburn has a copy of the November 22, 1994 letter, he received it 
from someone other than me or my office. No copy of the November 22, 1994 letter, 
was ever sent to Mr. Fishburn. 
11. Subsequent to the time I sent Exhibit No. 1 to Steve Evans, I had a 
conversation with him wherein he admitted receiving the letter. He claimed that he 
could not get a flight to Utah, and that was the reason he did not attend the November 
22, 1994 hearing. During that conversation, I again told him that Bob and I would not 
convey Sure-Tech to him or any of his family, and that I was going to settle the Sure-
Tech case on my own. 
12. Subsequent to the May 30, 1995, hearing, in reviewing my files, I found a 
letter from Fred Evans and Beatrice Evans, Steve's parents, to the Defendants in this 
matter, wherein they acknowledge that Bob Pett and I are the sole owners of Sure-Tech. 
A copy of that letter is attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit No. 6. In that letter, Mr. and 
Mrs. Evans acknowledge that Bob and I own 20% of EML. Sure-Tech ownes 20% of 
EML. Therefore, if Bob and I own 20% of EML, Bob and I own 100% of Sure-Tech. 
Neither Steve, his mother, his dad, or his wife were ever members of Sure-Tech, and 
Bob and I never conveyed our ownership of Sure-Tech to any of them. A copy of the 
limited partnership agreement for EML is attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit No. 7. 
Dated this - ' day of June 1995. 
Charles A. Schultz 
Subscribed and sworn to this^V / day of June 1995. 
/ , 
tyotary Public y P/i/^f 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
USA A* SPIVEY 
2654 Dearborn 
& * Uk« City, Utah 6410* 
My ComoOftoo Explft* 
NovtmtMW 1,1W« 
STATE OF UTAH 
Charles A. Schulbt 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
P.O. Box 526382 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84152-6382 
Telephone: i'801> 466-7308 
CERTIFIED MAIL 
November 22, 1994 
Steve Evans 
1902 Mary Dott Way 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Steve: 
I cannot believe you did not bother to come to the hearing today. The case against 
EML was only filed in order to secure your rights to work in the environmental field and 
particularly the right to use the waste water treatment system you assigned to EML. 
However, due to your failure to attend the hearing and dye also tp Lionel's failure to 
attend, I was disqualified as counsel for Sure-Tech.-
If you do not care about protecting your interests, 1 sure as hell don't. I am going to 
settle the suit against EML on the best feims for Sure-Tech. A settlement may have 
some incidental and unintentional affea on your patent claims. Therefore, i suggest that 
you obtain personal legal representation to advise you. 
Charles A. Schultz 
CAS/lbk 
cc: file 
EXHIBIT # _ 2 
UnUed Sutes Postal Service 
Official Business 
PENALTY FOB PHIVATt 
USE. #300 
Print your name, address and ZIP Code here 
Cnarles A. Schultz 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 5263a2 
SLC, OT 34152-6382 
SENDER: ^~" 
• Complete item** 1 and/or 2 for add»t»onal services. 
• Complete items 3. and 4a & b. 
• Print your name and address on the reverse of this form so 
that we can return this card to you. 
• Attach this form to the front of the mailpiece, or on the 
back if space does not permit. 
• Write "Return Receipt Requested" on the mailpiece next to 
the article number 
3. Aftiq)e Addressed to: 
Steve Evans
 f 
1^02 Marry Dott 
SLg# UT 84106 
5. Signa^re (Addressee) '" 1 
6. Signature (Agent) 
1 6l»o wish to rucoivtt the 
following service* (fo< an ex.ir* 
fee): 
1. D Addressee's Address 
?. LJ Restricted Delivery 
k
 Consult postmaster tot fue 
1 4a. Article Number 
P-80S 609 7S7 
' 4b. Swiffce Type 
Q Registered D Inaurud 
&D Certified D COD 
D Express Mail Q Return RuLe.pt for 
Mofi*f»n'-di&u 
7 Date of Delivery 
8. Addressee's Address (Only it requested 
and fee :s paid) 
••' *m+i 
.. psT^^frp^^^ 
Hi ii i - -n -^ ^-^ 
EXHIBIT # J & 
November 16, 1994 
P. Bryan Fishburn 
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER 
10 East South Temple, #800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
From: Mr. and Mrs. Fred B. Evans 
Dear Mr. Fishburn: 
Bryan as was discussed on Tuesday, we have written down an offer to settle 
as you know we are not able to speak for Sure-Tech but we have talked to 
Charles Schultz and he has assured us he*will go along with our suggested offer. 
We will settle the issues on the following terms and conditions: 
1. Equipment Lease shall be canceled upon payment of $50,000 dollars which 
shall make up for disposed of equipment and chemical and damaged equipment. 
2. Patent pending Waste Water Treatment System will be returned back to 
Steven Evans. The assignment canceled. 
3. Sure-Tech, Charles Schultz and Robert Pett shall be paid $50,000 dollars, 
in return, will return their 20% interest in EMLP. 
4. Everyone will agree to indemnity and hold harmless one another from 
any and all present or future litigation. All agreements and contracts 
between one another shall be canceled. 
If this settlement offer is acceptable to you, please contact me as soon 
as possible, so we can work out the details. 
Sincerely yours, 
Fred B. Evans 
Beatrice Evans 
EXHIBIT # _ & 
1.3 Duration. The Partnership shall commence as of the date of this Partnership 
Agreement, and shall continue until January 1, 2050, or until terminated pursuant to Article 
VII ot this Partnership Agreement, unless sooner terminated by process of law. 
1.4 Nature of Business. The principal business of the Partnership shall be to develop 
and implement a technology for the treatment of wastewater and for the recovery and removal 
of metals and hazardous materials from wastewater, soil and other waste products, and to 
engage in any other lawful act or activity not otherwise prohibited by law. 
1.5 General Partner. The name and address the General Partner and the General 
Partner's Interest in the Partnership is: 
NAME ADDRESS INTEREST 
WASTE PRODUCTS, INC. 6985 Union Park Center, 5 Units 
Suite 545, 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
1.6 Limited Partners. The name and place of residence of each Limited Partner and 
the Interest of each Limited Partner in the Partnership is: 
NAME ADDRESS INTEREST 
SURETECH, LLC. 345 East 400 South 20 Units 
Suite 101 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
ECOLOGY MANAGEMENT, 6985 Union Park Center, 75 Units 
LTD. Suite 545, 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
1.7 Issuance of Limited Partnership Units. Each Partner's Interest in the Partnership 
shall be denominated by Units of Partnership Interest ("Units"), and the total number of Units 
that the Partnership shall have authority to issue initially is One Hundred (100), five (5) of 
which shall be issued to the General Partner and shall represent the General Partner's Interest 
in the Partnership, and ninety-five (95) of which shall be issued to Limited Partners and 
represent the Limited Partners' Interests in the Partnership. All of the Units which the 
Partnership is presently authorized to issue shall, upon the execution hereof and payment for 
such Units as herein agreed be deemed to be issued as set forth above in paragraphs 1.5 and 
1.6. The General Partner shall be authorized to issue additional Units only with the 
concurrence of Limited Partners owning more than seventy-five percent (75%) of the 
Partners' Interests in the Partnership then outstanding. 
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Charles A. Schultz 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
P.O. Box 526382 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84152-6382 -fjjgS 
Telephone: (801)466-7308 fftj© O ^ ^ O ^ 0 1 
? 6 Y ^ 
April 25, 1995 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
Third District Judge 
240 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Sure-Tech v. EML. etal. Case No. 940902389 CV. 
Dear Judge Brian: 
Today, I received a copy of a Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice and an 
Order of Dismissal with Prejudice prepared by Richard K. Nebeker, acting as counsel for 
EML> et. al. (Copies enclosed). The Stipulation was also signed by Scott Daniels, as 
counsel for Sure-Tech. Mr. Daniels has no authority to represent Sure-Tech in this 
matter. Mr. Daniels has never been retained to act as counsel for Sure-Tech. No one 
representing Sure-Tech has ever spoken to Mr. Daniels about this case, and Sure-Tech 
does not authorize dismissal of this case. 
Robert Pett and I are the only managers of Sure-Tech, and we are the only 
members. Neither of us ever asked Mr. Daniels to represent Sure-Tech in any 
proceeding, and neither one of us ever authorized Mr. Daniels to sign a stipulation 
dismissing the referenced matter. Therefore, as a Manager and member of Sure Tech 
and on behalf of Mr. Pett as a manager and member of Sure-Tech, I ask that you not 
sign the Order of Dismissal, as Mr. Daniels is not authorized to represent Sure-Tech and 
dismiss the law suit. 
Respectfully: 
Charles A. Schultz 
CAS/lbk 
cc: Robert J. Pett 
Scott Daniels 
Richard K. Nebeker 
file 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SURE-TECH 
-VS-
E M L PROJECTS 
ECOLOGY MANAGEMENT 
PLAINTIFF, 
DEFENDANT. 
NOTICE 
CASE NO. 940902389 CV 
HONORABLE PAT B BRIAN 
PLEASE BE ADVISED THAT THE ABOVE-NAMED CASE HAS BEEN SET BEFORE 
JUDGE PAT B BRIAN, AS FOLLOWS: 
THIS CASE IS SET FOR MOTION TO DISMISS FOR 30 MINUTES. 
DATE: MAY 30, 1995 
PLACE: ROOM 310 
TIME: 9:00 A.M. 
ADDRESS: CIRCUIT COURT BUILDING 
200 EAST 451 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
PHONE: (801) 535-5581 
DATED THIS 22ND DAY OF MAY, 1995 
JUDGE/DEPUTY CLERK J ^ W " 
COPIES MAILED TO PARTIES OR COUNSEL AT THE ADDRESSES INDICATED ON 
THE ATTACHED MAILING CERTIFICATE. 
the proceeding. lf m , e s s { t h r e e *">««$ clays prior to 
TDD phone for hearing impaired, 535-5009. 
MR. DANIELS: That's the order that I submitted when 
we settled the case. Mr. Schultz has taken the position that I 
can/t do that, because I don't represent Sure-Tech, and that's 
the issue here today, and why I asked for a hearing, because I 
guess we need to take some evidence and determine just who is 
Sure-Tech, and that's the issue* 
THE COURT: You may proceed. 
MR. DANIELS: I would like to call Mr. Steve Evans as 
a witness. 
STEVEN THOMAS EVANS, 
called as a witness, being first duly sworn, was examined and 
testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. DANIELS: 
Q. State your full name for the record. 
A. Steven Thomas Evans. 
Q. Are you familiar with a business entity known as 
Sure-Tech? 
A. Yes, I am. 
Q. What kind of a business entity is that? 
A. It is an LLC. 
Q. Limited liability company? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Are you a member of that? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. Are you at this moment a manager of Sure-Tech? 
A. Mo, I am not. 
Q. Who are the managers of Sure-Tech, to your knowledge? 
A. Well, at this time, we had a meeting of members, and 
Fred Evans and Lionel Koon were elected as the new managers. 
Q. Fred Evans is your father? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Let me show you what has been marked Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 1. Do you recognize that document? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What is that? 
A. This was the original document, when Sure-Tech was 
first put together, as to who the members or the make-up of 
members was to be. 
Q. Were there changes in that, subsequently? 
A. Yes, there were. Mr. Bradshaw was not included in as 
any involvement in Sure-Tech, and we rearranged, you know, what 
the positions were. It was going to be Charles Schultz and 
Robert Pett were to be the managers, and myself, my father, my 
mother and Charlie were to have ownership. 
Q. So this 2 6 percent that belonged to Dean Bradshaw was 
supposed to be distributed through the other members? 
A. No, we just canceled it out. 
Q. So your percentage increased to over something over 
50 percent, I guess? 
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A. Yes, I did. 
Q. That's a document that, in your view, settles this 
case? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Let me back up a little bit. The Sure-Tech 
corporation, or LLC, was formed and the articles filed, 
according to the exhibit, January 14, 1993? 
A. Uh-huh (affirmative)• 
Q. At that time you were about a 50-percent owner, 
right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Your father and mother owned some percentage? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Mr. Schultz owned some percentage? 
A. That's right. 
Q. What was the purpose of Sure-Tech? What was its 
function? 
A. Well, it was set up — I developed some applications 
for water treatment, and we entered into a contract with a 
company called Ecology Management, which EML Projects, Ltd., 
where I assigned the future patent rights. In return for them 
having the right to sell that or market that waste treatment 
system, which I had ownership to, we were to be given 20-
percent ownership of EML Projects, Ltd. So we then set up 
Sure-Tech, LLC, because Charlie had been involved with us in 
8 
1 past businesses. My father had been involved, and myself. So 
2 ve set up Sure-Tech, LLC, as the vehicle to be able to disburse 
3 all profit and loss. Mr. Schultz and then his law clerk, 
4 Robert Pett, were set up as the managers of Sure-Tech, LLC, 
5 because I had tax liability, and I couldn't show as any part to 
6 it. 
7 Q. You didn't want your name on the public records? 
8 I A. That's right. 
9 1 Q. In your view, you were a member? 
10 A. Yes. Well, from my view, I owned the company. I was 
11 the largest owner of the company. 
12 Q. Then your father owned some? 
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. And Mr. Schultz owned some. What did he do to 
15 contribute? 
16 A. Mr. Schultz contributed some cash, but it was mostly 
17 his time and energy as an attorney and legal counsel. 
18 I Q. You kind of paid your attorney's fees by giving him 
19 part of it? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. The purpose of the LLC was to distribute the money 
22 you received — 
23 I A. It was to distribute any of the profit or loss that 
24 would be received from EML Projects, Ltd., bacfc to us. That's 
25 what an LLC is set up for. You can have that vehicle so that 
1 THE COURT: Cross-examination? 
2 I MR. NEBEKER: The defendant has no questions. 
3 THE COURT: You may proceed. 
4 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
5 BY MR. GUYON: 
6 I Q. Mr. Schultz, when did you first became aware of the 
7 organization of Sure-Tech, a limited liability company, here? 
8 A. Mr. Evans, you mean? 
9 1 Q. Yeah. 
10 A. We organized Sure-Tech, LLC back when we started 
11 negotiations with EML Projects, Ltd., and that was in December, 
12 I believe, of '93. 
13 Q. I have here the articles of incorporation, which 
14 indicate they were signed and prepared on the 13th and 14th of 
15 January of 1993. Do you have any recollection of that 
16 activity? 
17 A. You mean Exhibit 4? 
18 I Q. I believe that is the exhibit. 
19 A. Yes. 
20 I Q. The signatures there, Mr. Robert Pett and 
21 Mr. Schultz; is that correct? 
22 A. That's right. 
23 Q. You indicated in your prior testimony that the first 
24 meeting that you attended was one that was recently held, at 
25 which the managers were changed; is that correct? 
17 
I 
A. That's right. 
Q. You never attended any meeting prior to that time? 
A. No. 
Q. Are you aware of the existence of an operating 
agreement of Sure-Tech, Ltd.? 
A* There was none. 
Q. There was none? 
I am sorry, your Honor, I only have an original and 
copy. May I approach? 
THE COURT: You may. 
Q. Mr. Schultz — I mean Mr. Evans, what is the title of 
that document? 
A. It shows here operating agreement of Sure-Tech, LLC. 
Q. I am going to direct your attention to pages 15 and 
16 of that agreement. Are there signatures there? 
A. Yes, there are. 
Q. Are they original signatures? 
A. I can't attest to that, but they look original. They 
are in blue inX. 
Q. Whose signatures are there? 
A. Robert Pett and Charles A. Schultz. 
Q. Directing your attention to section 1.4 on the first 
page of that document, whose names occur there? 
A. Robert J. Pett and Charles A. Schultz. 
Q. Directing your attention to section 1.4-1, the top of 
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1 the next page 2, indicates the managers? 
2 A* Robert J. Pett, Charles A. Schultz. 
3 Q. Directing your attention to page 3, article 5, 
4 section 5.1, indicates the members and the percentage of their 
5 contribution and its value. What is the contribution and value 
6 of Robert J. Pett's capital contribution, from that document? 
7 A. It shows $10. 
8 Q» That's what percentage? 
9 I A* 1 percent. 
10 Q. And it shows below that Mr. Schultz? 
11 A. $990. 
12 Q. What percentage is that? 
13 A. 99 percent. 
14 MR. GUYON: I move for the admission of the operating 
15 agreement of Sure-Tech. 
16 MR. DANIELS: Objection, lack of foundation. He has 
17 never seen it before. 
18 THE COURT: The Court will give you an opportunity to 
19 conduct voir dire on the foundation question, if you would 
20 like. 
21 MR. DANIELS: Have you ever seen that document 
22 before today? 
23 THE WITNESS: No, I have not. 
24 MR. DANIELS: That's all. 
25 THE COURT: Objection is overruled. It is received. 
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1 membership of the corporation? 
2 A. Yes, ve did. 
3 Q. Are you familiar with the applicable provisions of 
4 the limited liability partnership act as to that position? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 J Q. What do they provide, to your knowledge? 
7 A. Well, an LLC is put together to be able to distribute 
8 profit or loss to the members, and as we were to receive the 
9 profit or loss, that makes us members, and by being that we 
10 were members, we then held the meeting and made the changes. 
11 Q. Are you aware of the specific provision of the Utah 
12 Code Annotated Section 48-2b-131, which deals with transfer of 
13 membership? 
14 A. I have read through that, but no. 
15 Q. If I indicated to you that specifically it says or 
16 deals with — says that if the nontransferring members entitled 
17 to receive the majority of the nontransferred profits do not 
18 consent, the transferee has no right to participate in the 
19 management of the business. 
20 MR. DANIELS: I am sorry, what was your question? 
21 MR. GUYON: Is he familiar with that? 
22 A. No. 
23 Q. Are you familiar with the operating agreement 
24 requirements as to the transfer of ownership and management? 
25 A. Yes. 
21 
1 Q. What does that provide? 
2 A. If I remember right, as far as being a member or 
3 whatever, and going by what was filed by Mr. Schultz and 
4 Mr. Pett when the company was first formed, having the first 
5 meeting of members, we were able to and were to change the 
6 managers. 
7 Q. Are you familiar with Section 48-2b-122 of the code, 
8 which relates to the filing of, creating of additional members? 
9 It says, and I will quote, may be familiar with this, "'After 
10 the filing of a limited liability company/s original articles 
11 of organization, additional members may be admitted as provided 
12 in the operating agreement." Did you comply with the terms and 
13 conditions of the operating agreement in admitting yourselves 
14 as members to this limited liability corporation? 
15 A. There was no operating agreement. 
16 Q. It says, "If the operating agreement does not provide 
17 for the additional members, with the written consent of all 
18 members, except that, notwithstanding any provision of the 
19 operating agreement, no additional member may be admitted 
20 without the written consent of the members entitled to receive 
21 a majority of the profits of the company." Did you obtain 
22 written consent of Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz in performing your 
23 change of administration of this limited liability corporation? 
24 A. No. 
25 MR. GUYON: I have nothing further. 
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with Sure-Tech in that lawsuit* 
Q. And a response was received, you indicated, some 
months subsequent? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Approximately how long was that? 
A. it was just about two months. 
Q. Had there been a change in circumstances between the 
writing of your letter, Exhibit 6, and at receipt of the 
response, Exhibit 7? 
A. Yes. Prior to that time, approximately — I guess a 
week — no, probably ten days to two weeks after this November 
17 letter, I sent Steve Evans a letter retracting my offer of 
November 17. 
Q. Do you have a copy of that letter with you? 
A. I do not have a copy of it with me. 
Q. To whom was that letter addressed? 
A. It was sent to Steve Evans. 
Q. What was its purpose? 
A. Its purpose was to let him know that the offer to 
convey Sure-Tech to him and his parents was no longer on the 
table. 
MR. GDYON: Thank you. Nothing further. 
MR. DANIELS: You don't have a copy of that letter? 
THE WITNESS: I don't have it with me, no. 
MR. DANIELS: Do you have one in your file? 
27 
MR. 6UY0N: None, your Honor. 
THE COURT: You may step down. 
MR. DANIELS: I would like to call Mr. Evans again, 
briefly, for one rebuttal question. 
STEVEN THOMAS EVANS, 
called as a witness, being first duly sworn, was examined and 
testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. DANIELS: 
Q. You were just here when Mr. Schultz testified that 
shortly after the November letter he sent you a letter 
rescinding his offer to convey the Sure-Tech interest to you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you ever receive such a letter? 
A. No, we did not. 
MR. DANIELS: No more questions. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. GUYON: 
Q. Mr. Evans, have you ever been convicted of a felony? 
MR. DANIELS: Your Honor, I need to say something 
about this before we go on, if I may. Mr. Schultz has filed 
several papers in the other lawsuit, and now in this one, 
wherein he says that Mr. Evans is a felon. The truth is 
Mr. Evans was convicted of a felony, that conviction was 
expunged, and the record sealed. So it is not a proper matter 
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1 THE COURT: If you would like, the Court will permit 
2 you to proffer that evidence. Frankly, the Court is inclined 
3 to follow what has historically been adopted as the best 
4 evidence rule, and that is the document or the writing itself. 
5 And absent that, the Court is inclined to give little weight to 
6 anything else. But if you would like to augment the record by 
7 way of proffer or by calling the witnesses, you are welcome to 
8 do so. 
9 MR. GUYON: I can do that. Both of them are present 
10 in the courtroom. I could probably do it more quickly by 
11 proffer. 
12 THE COURT: Go ahead. 
13 MR. GUYON: If Mr. Schultz were called as a witness 
14 here at this point, he would testify that there were a number 
15 of annual meetings, and would present documents for the first 
16 annual meeting of Sure-Tech, a limited liability company, which 
17 occurred January 26, 1994. Present were Robert Pett and 
18 Charles Schultz. The only members — 
19 THE COURT: Why don't you go from November of 1994, 
2 0 which is the critical dates involving today's hearing, and then 
21 proceed from that date forward, to May 30, 1995. 
22 MR. GUYON: The documents that I have, your Honor, 
23 are November 24, 1993, which is a copy of the — 
24 THE COURT: Go to 1994. 
25 MR. GUYON: I am sorry. 
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THE COURT: Anything you would like to present or 
proffer from November of 1994 to May 30 of 1995 would be 
critical, in the Court's opinion. 
MR. GUYON: Here is the April 27, 1995 report, which 
was filed with the Department of Corporations, indicating the 
managers of Sure-Tech, Ltd., to be Robert J. Pett and Charles 
Schultz, the members to be Robert Pett and Charles Schultz. 
THE COURT: Who prepared that document? 
MR. GUYON: That is prepared and I believe signed by 
Charles Schultz. 
THE COURT: Was that signed by any other owner or 
manager of Sure-Tech? 
MR. GUYON: No, your Honor, it is not. 
There is a document entitled "Amendments,19 which I 
believe was filed on the 10th day of April, 1995, which is the 
purported articles of amendment, which are signed as dated, 
April 30, I believe, 1995, and are signed by Lionel Koon, Fred 
Evans and Steve Evans, including a statement that they are 
authorized as members to sign that. 
THE COURT: What does that document purport to do? 
MR. GUYON: Purports to amend the articles of 
organization. 
THE COURT: Does that include or exclude Mr. Schultz 
from the business? 
MR. GUYON: Article 4 is amended to substitute Steve 
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Evans as registered agent. Article 5 is amended to substitute 
I believe it is his home address, 1902 Mary Dott Way, Salt Lake 
City, and to appoint as managers of Sure-Tech Lionel Koon and 
Fred B. Evans. 
THE COURT: The Court has that document. 
MR. GUYON: There is another document here entitled 
the second annual meeting of Sure-Tech, Ltd. It is dated 
February 19, 1995. Present at that meeting were Robert Pett 
and Charles Schultz, identifying themselves as the only members 
of the LLC. This document is signed by Robert J. Pett and 
Charles A. Schultz. I believe, your Honor, those are the only 
documents• 
We would like to offer or at least have the Court 
take judicial notice of other documents that relate to the 
filings in there as part of the record. I don't think they 
relate, given the Court's ruling here. 
Lisa Spivey is Mr. Schultz' secretary. She is 
present in the courtroom. If she were called to testify, the 
proffer that I would make on her behalf is that she assisted in 
the preparation of the letter, withdrawing the offer that we 
have discussed, that was made in November, and that she 
personally inserted it in the U. S. mails. 
THE COURT: All right. Anything further? 
MR. GUYON: The only thing is, for purposes of the 
record, how to provide that these documents become part of it. 
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] THE COURT: The Court will give you t .he leeway, 
2 :: nc 1 1 :i sa :: n :: f th ,. s hearing I o Ilia1 ;e I,hem 
3 marked as the defendant's next in order, " absent some 
4 objection, they will be received into the record. 
5 3Stimonyf as 
6 proffered r>r ^isa Spivey, object on the basis of 
7 Utah Rules of Evidence No. 1004, commonly referred to "iMI tlio 
9 J Court for its order excluding from evidence and striking fror 
evidence any reference to that letter I,)illlli IHIP rl ""in I I I H • 
THE COUH The objection is suulainudj and the 
notion to strike is granted. That's been l;.he Court's position 
13 | from the outss : Il: ,h. a he a ri n gill 
t t, anything further? Does anyone want to 
further , make any other presentation 
16 
rules? 
GUYON: uuld like to call and place on the 
• 
THE COURT or what purpose? 
GUYOl* * '*vi» « as some additional testimony 
elates « osition *. t aonmembers^ . * this organization 
resuming * • » * • -
utory provisions tnat contr. » w i > . 
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1 THE COURT: You may. 
2 CHARLES A. SCHULTZ, 
3 called as a witness, being first duly sworn, was examined and 
4 testified as follows: 
5 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
6 BY MR. GUYON: 
7 Q. Mr. Schultz, you have been sworn. You are still 
8 under oath. Mr. Schultz, quickly as possible, could you 
9 explain to the Court the circumstances under which this 
10 corporation was organized, its compliance with the provisions 
11 of the applicable code, and circumstances that led to your — 
12 just a background update into your letter of November of 1994. 
13 A. Sure-Tech, LLC, was formed, as it says in the 
14 documents, for the purpose of investing in various companies 
15 and projects and holding ownership interest in it. Sure-Tech 
16 was formed by Robert Pett and me. Robert Pett and I at all 
17 times have been the only members and only managers of Sure-
18 Tech. Mr. Evans, his parents, Mr. Koon, no one else was ever 
19 member. They were never intended to be a member, for the very 
20 reasons that Mr. Evans alluded to in his testimony. They both 
21 had tax problems and both had tax liabilities. 
22 It is true they were to receive a portion of the 
23 profits of EML, if they ever made any profits, and that was 
24 distributed through Sure-Tech, but that was a separate 
25 agreement. They were never intended to be managers, never 
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1 i ill! , EH i  i lis ill Il : • be members, because, if they were, the IRS could 
2 then seize their interest ;i n Sure-Tech. For that very reason, 
3 they were never made member s If EMI I it, 1 ' ' "lie a ny f re f:i t 
4 , II JI it i! ii 1 1 in ! „ il been distributed through Sure-Tech, i t would have 
5 been distributed along the lines thai testified to at my 
6 I depositi^r v M • *" r case but i ! 
/ ntenaea to aembers* 
They would have received some sort * consulting 
areement ive bee | posely and 
t s.. * ^ ically set up so thai tlioy would no I: be members. The 
amberH u^tilcl i"i« Mr P « I I and me. That was he • i t H a s 
agreement 
13 I provided foa specifically states i n there that the only 
embers would be Mr. Pett and rhn initial meetinc nutea 
•I 11 i J i n , i I in mi mi I I mi in i in in i i I II II 1 J - . i . * „ 
those here as records, 1h« originals plus 
— p ^ & & . 
annual report, thu first annual report, filed 
-?ith the Department Corporations, shown that the only 
20 | members were Mr. Pett ana v ' ill lecond I Ii i iLiijlL 
records specified Mr, \ i and me 
v i" , * tends econd annual meeting, Mr. Pett 
me were members only 
:t,, IBB ar** * ^^2.-., .._. -vans and family were never 
members, never intended to be members, and for that very 
reason. 
The letter of November 17 was sent prior to the 
hearing in this court on the motion to disqualify, and prior to 
a number of other things taking place. As I testified earlier, 
when I terminated my business relationship with Mr. Evans and 
Mr. Koon, I did not want to have anything further to do with 
them. I sent Mr. Evans' letter, specifically saying that we 
would convey Sure-Tech to him and his family, because there was 
a side agreement with EML that said that if EML goes out of 
business, is dissolved, that 50 percent of the patent rights 
would come to Sure-Tech. 
Neither Mr. Pett nor I claim any interest in those 
patent rights, and it was our intention Steve would always get 
those. If they came to Sure-Tech, we would convey those to 
Steve. We thought this would be the best way to facilitate 
this. But when Mr. Evans failed to appear for the hearing, 
failed to do other things that were required, it cost us to 
incur more time, litigation expense, more liability, we then 
withdrew that offer. We sent that off approximately ten days 
to two weeks after this. In fact, I think it was the day of 
the hearing, disqualification hearing, or the day after. 
MR. DANIELS: I would ask that be stricken on the 
basis of Rule 1004. 
THE COURT: Overruled. The Court will give Counsel 
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an opportunity onnect 
A. : It: l:i B H : a i 1 s •  E i::i 1: mj n Bip he H 
pick it up probably :i i i 2 0 minutes. That 
* •< * -'-* ocument that was prepared and sent* Miss Spivey can 
( ( I I I i 1 1 1 mi in1! II Il ::i ill: iiiiii 11 1 11 lit iiili Ill cii ^  ft :ii 1: "Ill !h e i c : > e jili :IE; ^  IIIIID ,/« : > 
doubt , This acceptance offer was received some 
time after. 
asked by Mr, Fishburn about this same document, estified 
then it ha* K*«.™ rejected, and Mr* Evans accepted it on! y after 
I llM I H | H < I . . . 
Mr. Evans never was a member of Sure -Tech . Fred 
Evans was never imber «r I" Hure-Tech Bea Evans was never a 
membe: Sure-Tech . They were neve r i n t e n d e d t : • b si Th e r e 
a r e i in > documents t h a t i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e y a r e members, ever were 
::i lit ended .-* - -, and nev e r ha d III in 1 5 ::i n texnut , 
A l s o , r e s p e c t to t l i i s a l l e g e d meet ing t h a t the] 
hadj 1 neve r r e c e i v e d any n o t i c e of t h a t m e e t i n g . Mr. P e t t 
'in n v 1  'i 1 r fl c" n i \ 1 Il J 111 mi 1 1 in in 111 III, 1 11 11 I" III III in! III III IIIIII 1 "i 1 1 III i 11 \ i\ H IIIIII m IIIIII Hi o r 11 Il II 112 j 
could not have a meeting with respect It) Nu ire-Tech, because 
t.hey weren't members, never were members. 
Mllli".. (.linn "' mi in fsiii! ill II iii III in III Ill Ill ' I1 IIIIII 111111 1 n o d III il 
the best way possib] e. 
THE COURT: Any questions? 
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morning, dealing with the authority to enter into the 
settlement agreement and the order of dismissal being signed by 
the Court, the Court finds and rules as follows: The hearing 
was set for 9:00 a.m., May 30, 1995. It is now ten after 
eleven. The estimate for the hearing was one hour. The Court 
still has not received any letter from the office of 
Mr. Schultz, indicating that there was a change in the position 
of Mr. Schultz to convey his interest to the Evanses on the 
Sure-Tech company. 
And the Court finds that the best evidence rule 
applies, and, absent any document to the contrary, the Court 
does not give any substantial weight to the representations 
made that after November 17, 1994, and before January 9 of 
1995, or before April 9 of 1995, there was ever any change in 
Mr. Schultz' willingness to convey his interest in Sure-Tech. 
The Court further finds as follows: The chronology 
of events are as follows: November 17, 1994, Mr. Evans is the 
recipient of a letter authored by Mr. Schultz, wherein he 
states as follows: "It is my intention to convey my interest 
in Sure-Tech, and Bob," assuming that's Bob Pett, "will also 
convey his interest in Sure-Tech to you or to whoever you 
direct. Advise me to whom you wish it conveyed. I will not 
dismiss the case against EML so that you or whomever you direct 
can decide what to do." That's precisely what occurred several 
months later. "However, I am going to withdraw as counsel for 
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SURE-TECH, 1,1,(••, 
L'liiint I J I , 
vs. 
E.M.L. PROJECTS, LTD., ECOLOGY 
MANAGEMENT, LTD. ami WASTE 
PRODUCTS, INC., 
Defendants. 
) 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
PREJUDICE 
Civxl No. 940902389 CV 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
Based on the stipulation of I In puities dated the <=^:< " 
day of April, 1995, and for good cause showing, it is hereby; 
ORDERED, that the above entitled c:\sti I ir . I 1111 liorob 
dismissed with prejudice, each parly lu hi ai the 11 own i 
and fees. 
s 
DATED this rvl m, •. 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
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RE: S u r e - T e c h , LLC v . E.M.L. P r o j e c t s , e t a l , 
Our F i l e No.- 1 8 7 4 1 . 0 0 1 
Dear Mr. Guyon: 
I received the copy of the Affidavit of Lisa Spivey that you 
sent me along with the attachments. I didn't have any idea that 
the letter of November 22, 1994, was the letter that Charles 
Schultz was referring to. Steve did receive that letter, and I 
have a copy of it in my file. When Mr. Schultz testified that he 
had sent a letter to Steve revoking his offer to return his 
interest in Sure-Tech, I thought he must be referring to another 
letter because I don't read the letter of November 22 as saying 
that. 
Very truly yours, 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
^cdMQtpdli 
S c o t t D a n i e l s 
SD:cah 
cc: Honorable Pat B. Brians/ 
Richard K. Nebeker 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
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SURE-TECH, TJiC. , 
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L*h.^. PROJECTS , LTD., ECOLOGY 
MANAGEMENT, LTD It 1 1 WASTE 
PRODUCTS, INC., 
Defendants. 
i y 02 1 'CE OF APPEAL 
Civi l 940902389CV 
I ( )M1' N< i\V, Uo\w\ I .'I II"! Ml Miii.l d t i a r l e u A. UcJiuiLz and a p p e a l t o 
the Utah Supreme Court from the Order of Dismissal of this matter 
d a t e d Ma} 3 1 Il  ,irM 
Dated Mi i '"X ' ^ ^ 
\ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SURE-TECH, LLC, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
E.M.L. PROJECTS, LTD., et al. , 
Defendants. 
COURT RULING 
Civil No. 940902389 CV 
JUDGE PAT B. BRIAN 
Schultz' Motion to Vacate Order of Dismissal is denied 
DATED this ^ date of August, 1995. 
JudgePatBri 
Date: 
Clerk: 
*/fa>M 
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STATE OF UTAH 
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SURE-TECH, LLC, : AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
E.M.L. PROJECTS, LTD., ECOLOGY 
MANAGEMENT, LTD., and WASTE 
PRODUCTS, INC., 
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Judge: Pat B. Brian 
Appeal No. 950343 
--oooOooo— 
COME NOW, Robert J. Pett and Charles A. Schultz and appeal to 
the Utah Supreme Court from the Order of Dismissal entered against 
them on May 30, 1995, and the Court Ruling denying their Rule 60 
Motion entered August 9, 1995. 
Dated this day of August 1995, 
Charles A. Schultz 
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